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structural transformation in less developed countries, or do they instead entrench such countries in low-profitability, low-growth
GVC activities? Despite great policy interest, only recently has academic research begun to overcome data and conceptual chal-
lenges to dispel common speculation and uncertainty around these issues.
In this paper, we take first steps towards documenting how firms position themselves in GVCs and how this position evolves with
productivity and performance over the firm lifecycle, using matched firm-level customs and manufacturing survey data for China.
China provides a fascinating context in which to study the implications of global production sharing for firm and aggregate growth.
As the fastest growing economy over the last 30 years, China recently became the second largest country by GDP and the biggest ex-
porter in the world. Key to this economic transformation has been its dramatic globalization, marked by its joining theWTO in 2001
(Feenstra andWei, 2010).1 Indeed, various trade and industrial policies have encouraged firms' participation in GVCs, such as the for-
malization of a processing trade regimeunderwhich foreign inputs can be importedduty-free for further processing, assembly and re-
exporting (Manova and Yu, 2016), or the establishment of special economic zones that concentrate trade and FDI activity.
Our first contribution is to characterize Chinese firms' position in GVCs and trace its evolution over the 1992–2014 period. We
exploit detailed Input-Output Tables for China to build an industry-level measure of upstreamness for 135 industries. Introduced
by Fally (2012) and Antràs et al. (2012), this measure captures an industry's distance to final demand in terms of the weighted
average number of stages at which the industry is used as a production input before it reaches final uses (i.e., consumption or
investment). Higher values are associated with more upstream sectors (e.g., rubber), and lower values indicate sectors that are
more proximate to final demand (e.g., cars).
We quantify Chinese firms' global production line position by combining this industrymeasure of upstreamnesswith detailed infor-
mation on the product composition of firms' trade flows. This allows us to construct weighted-average upstreamness measures of a
firm's imports, UM, and of its exports, UX. The difference between the two, UM− UX, is thus informative of the span of production stages
that thefirmundertakeswithinChina, either bydirectly performing these or byoutsourcing to other suppliers in China. TheChinese cus-
toms data permit us to construct thesemeasures at the firm level for 2000–2014.We are further able to draw on province- or city-level
customs data for earlier years, to analyze trends in the upstreamness of China's aggregate trade flows for the more extended period of
1992–2014.
We identify three Macro Trends in China's GVC participation. First, over 1992–2014, Chinese imports became significantly more
upstream, while Chinese exports became slightly more proximate to final demand. Of note, these trends tapered off after 2008,
coinciding with when China's trade-to-GDP ratio reached its peak and started to moderate (IMF, 2016; Frankel, 2016). These de-
velopments were mainly driven by ordinary trade, rather than by flows administered under processing and other trade regimes.
Second, using a formal decomposition, we show that the rise in aggregate import upstreamness between 2000 and 2014 is ex-
plained by both the net entry of firms that tend to import further upstream (the extensive margin) and by within-firm increases
in import upstreamness (the intensive margin). Third, we exploit regressions with firm and year fixed effects to confirm that
within firms over time, imports became significantly more upstream, exports became moderately more proximate to final de-
mand, and the implied span of production stages performed in China increased quickly during 2000–2014.
Our second contribution is to establish new stylized facts about the relationship between Chinese firms' attributes, production
line position, operations, and performance over the firm lifecycle. We document three Firm Facts about the evolution in activity
within firms over time. First, when firms become more productive, bigger or more experienced, they import significantly more
upstream, export moderately closer to final demand, and span more production stages in China. These results hold across different
measures of firm productivity (real value added per worker, revenue-based TFP estimates à la Olley-Pakes, Levinsohn-Petrin, or
Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer), firm size (sales, employment), and firm experience (age, cumulative past trade activity).
Second, when firms span more production stages (in China), they increase their value added in production, total purchases of
material inputs, and use of labor inputs (as captured by the total wagebill), all proportionately with output. Third, when Chinese
firms perform more production steps, they also raise their fixed costs and assets (proxied respectively by inventory holdings and
by net plant, property and equipment), and earn higher profits. Of note, profit margins – in terms of profit-to-sales, profit-to-
value-added, or profit-to-assets ratios – remain largely unchanged.
We establish these three Firm Facts with a baseline specification that controls not only for firm fixed effects, but also for sector-
by-year fixed effects that absorb any common supply and demand shocks at the industry level. We have found these patterns to
be robust under extensive sensitivity checks. The results hold whether or not we further condition on firm-level measures of skill
intensity (average wage), capital intensity (net fixed assets per worker), or the share of processing trade. The Firm Facts pertaining
to the span of production stages, UM − UX, hold also when we control directly for the upstreamness of the firm's exports, UX, to
capture where along global production chains the firm is positioned relative to final demand. We have also obtained similar pat-
terns with alternative constructions of the firm-level upstreamness measures, such as when we drop imports and exports of non-
manufacturing products, or of mineral products more specifically.
Our third contribution is to develop a partial-equilibrium model of a firm's decision over where to operate along the produc-
tion chain and which production stages to perform in order to maximize its profits. Our goal is to provide a baseline conceptual
framework that can rationalize the Firm Facts in the data and highlight key economic mechanisms at play, rather than to fully
characterize firm interactions, price-setting and market-clearing in general equilibrium.1 Brandt et al. (2008) quantify the contribution of two other sources of structural transformation to China's phenomenal growth over 1978–2004: large-scale
reallocations from agriculture towards manufacturing and services, and from state-owned enterprises towards private firms. At the same time, Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) conclude that there is still extensive misallocation of productive resources across Chinese firms compared to the US.
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more complete products along a sequential production line, and sell their output in competitive markets. Each firm faces decisions
on how upstream (or unfinished) an intermediate input to purchase, and on how proximate to final demand (or finished) an out-
put to produce; these in turn determine the firm's span of production stages. Looking upstream, firms face a trade-off between
sourcing a more fully processed but more expensive input and incurring the fixed and variables costs of performing the
inframarginal production steps. Looking downstream, firms likewise weigh the benefit of selling a more finished output at a
higher market price against the fixed and variable costs of undertaking more production stages. We show that when these
inframarginal fixed and variables costs are relatively small, the model implies a complementarity between the scale of a firm's
production and the scope of stages it performs: an exogenous positive shock to productivity would induce the firm to both
span more production stages and operate on a bigger scale, ultimately earning higher profits.
Through the lens of this stylized model, we interpret our first Firm Fact as consistent with a causal effect of changes in a firm's
productivity on its optimal production line position. This interpretation extends to the findings for firm size and experience, to the
extent that more productive firms have higher survival probability and changes in firm size arise from underlying shifts in firm
productivity. In line with this causal interpretation, we report additional empirical results based on an instrumental variable ap-
proach: We adopt an IV for firm productivity or for firm size that captures how exposed Chinese firms are to plausibly exogenous
shocks to foreign demand.2 On the other hand, we view our second and third Firm Facts as correlations among joint outcomes of
the firm's profit maximization problem that reflect optimal operational decisions and resulting profits.
Our findings shed light on policy questions about the implications of GVCs for firm growth, and challenge concerns about GVC-
induced stagnation traps. The new evidence we uncover suggests that the fragmentation of production across countries can en-
able firms to first specialize in narrower segments of GVCs and gradually expand into more production stages, grow their produc-
tion scale, add more value, and earn higher profits. While we do not explicitly incorporate this consideration in our model, this
growth path may be especially important in emerging economies where less productive and less experienced firms stand to
gain more from knowledge transfer from foreign buyers and suppliers. Credit constrained firms may likewise be able to start
by operating fewer production stages, in order to accumulate retained earnings and use internal capital to fund subsequent ex-
pansion along the supply chain. The firm lifecycle facts we have uncovered in a world with GVCs therefore point to potential
macro-level implications that future work can explore.3
Our work contributes to several strands of research. We extend a growing literature in international trade on the rise of GVCs.
Early empirical analyses have aimed to infer the country origins of value added embedded in country-level trade flows, and doc-
umented the increased fragmentation of production across borders (e.g., Hummels et al., 2001; Yi, 2003; Johnson and Noguera,
2012; Koopman et al., 2014). Much subsequent work has emphasized the important role of international supply chain linkages
for firm operations. Successful exporters routinely use a large share of imported inputs in producing for foreign markets (e.g.,
Bernard et al., 2012). This is especially true in developing economies, where the range, cost and quality of domestic intermediates
may be ill-suited to manufacturing products that meet the quality standards of foreign consumers and the technological needs of
foreign downstream producers (e.g., Kugler and Verhoogen, 2009, 2012; Bas and Strauss-Kahn, 2015). Indeed, more than half of
Chinese exports are conducted under processing trade, and the large majority of Chinese exporters intensively use imported in-
puts (e.g., Manova and Zhang, 2012; Wang and Yu, 2012; Manova and Yu, 2017).
We specifically advance recent work on global production lines, in which the production process is viewed as a technologically
sequenced series of stages. We provide one of the first firm-level analyses and document novel stylized facts that speak to the
relatively small body of existing models in this literature. At the aggregate level, Costinot et al. (2013) examine how cross-country
productivity differences affect the span of stages that countries specialize in. Fally (2012) and Antràs et al. (2012) conceptualize
and empirically implement measures of the upstreamness of different industries along production chains. Antràs and de Gortari
(2020) build and quantify a model that explores how the geography of trade costs affects the equilibrium formation of global pro-
duction chains. In a related line of work, Antràs and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2019) investigate how firms that operate in
sequential production chains would optimally organize their sourcing strategies, vis-à-vis whether to integrate within firm bound-
aries or outsource to arm's length suppliers the procurement of each customized stage input. While their predictions are often
rich and subtle, these existing models do not fully rationalize the new patterns we uncover in the Chinese data.
To the best of our knowledge, we present a first analysis of the relationship between firms' inherent attributes, production line
position, internal operations, and performance over the firm lifecycle. This provides a bridge between research by trade econo-
mists on GVC activity, and research by development, industrial organization, and macro economists on firm growth and structural
transformation. Prior studies have linked access to imported inputs and learning from foreign partners to firm productivity growth
(e.g., Amiti and Konings, 2007; Kasahara and Rodrigue, 2008; Goldberg et al., 2010; Halpern et al., 2015), examined trade-related
growth in productivity and domestic value added within Chinese firms (e.g., Brandt et al., 2012, Kee and Tang, 2016, Tang et al.,
2020), and showed that processing trade can be a stepping stone to higher value added, more profitable and more liquidity-in-
tensive ordinary trade in the presence of financial frictions (e.g., Manova and Yu, 2016). A separate line of research has identified
systematic patterns at both the country and firm levels in the expansion of product scope and in the transition across products,2 Wehave also implemented an alternative IV based on each Chinesefirm's exposureon the import side to rest-of-the-world trade shocks. This builds off the idea that
increased access to imported inputs can raise firm productivity. The results obtained are very similar; see Section 4.2.2.
3 Recent work suggests that heterogeneous dynamics and shock propagation across firms can indeed have sizeable effects onmacro-economic outcomes. For exam-
ple, Di Giovanni et al. (2018), Kramarz et al., 2020, and Gaubert and Itskhoki (2018) find important effects of micro-level granularity on exposure to foreign demand
shocks, international business cycle comovement, and comparative advantage in the aggregate.
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tion (e.g., Hausmann and Klinger, 2007; Bernard et al., 2010; Boehm et al., 2019). A growing body of work has examined price-
setting and rent-sharing along supply chains, using buyer-supplier data from markets in developing countries characterized by
small upstream producers and large downstream processors and distributors (e.g., Macchiavello and Miquel-Florensa, 2017;
Macchiavello and Morjaria, 2019; Cajal-Grossi et al., 2020).4 Finally, there is a long tradition of studying the internal span of con-
trol in models of firm boundaries with (dis)economies of scope and scale (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1981; Becker and Murphy,
1992; Kikuchi et al., 2018; Fally and Hillberry, 2018).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data and the industry measure of upstreamness. Section 3 uncovers
Macro Trends in China's position in GVCs during 1992–2014. Section 4 establishes Firm Facts about the joint evolution of firm at-
tributes, production line position, production activities, and performance over the firm lifecycle. Section 5 presents a model of firm
behavior that rationalizes the empirical patterns. Section 6 concludes. The online appendix contains all theoretical proofs and sup-
plementary tables and figures.2. Data
2.1. Trade statistics
We examine the evolution of China's international trade activity over 1992–2014 using three comprehensive datasets from the
General Administration of the Chinese Customs. The first dataset covers the 1992–1996 period. It reports the value of total exports
and imports in US dollars for each Chinese province, HS 6-digit product (about 5,000 categories), firm ownership type, and trade
regime. The second dataset provides slightly more disaggregated data for the years 1997–1999. It records the value of total ex-
ports and imports in US dollars for each Chinese city, HS 8-digit product (about 6,500 categories), firm ownership type, and
trade regime. We will use these first two datasets to shed light on aggregate trends in import and export upstreamness for
China during the 1990s.
The third dataset – the Chinese Customs Trade Statistics (CCTS) – comprises the universe of China's international trade trans-
actions in 2000–2014. We observe for this period the value of firm-level exports and imports in US dollars, by HS 8-digit product,
firm ownership type, and transaction trade regime. To abstract from the seasonality and lumpiness inherent in monthly trade
flows, we aggregate this raw data to the annual level. When appended to the first two datasets, this extends our coverage of
country-level trends to the entire 1992–2014 period. At the same time, the CCTS provides our core sample for any firm-level re-
gression analyses that we conduct.5
The Chinese customs records allow us to distinguish between several firm ownership structures and operational modes. For
ownership, the data separates out trade flows that are conducted respectively by private domestic firms (PVT), state-owned en-
terprises (SOE), joint ventures (JV), and foreign-owned multinational affiliates (MNC). We also observe the volume of trade con-
ducted under various institutionally sanctioned regimes. For 1992–2006, we observe a full breakdown into ordinary, processing,
and a residual category of “other” trade regimes; for 2007–2014, however, the data include only a breakdown between ordinary
and non-ordinary trade, with the processing and “other” trade regimes reported as a single category. The processing trade regime
has played a prominent role in China's growth as a manufacturing hub, as it permits firms to bring inputs into China intended for
further processing, assembly and re-exporting on behalf of a foreign buyer without incurring import duties. Firms are allowed to
simultaneously conduct both processing and ordinary trade activities, and in practice about 25% of all exporters do so (Manova
and Yu, 2016).
Our sample period covers the dramatic expansion in China's export and import activity. Over 1992–2014, China's exports rose
from about $84.9 billion in 1992 to close to $2.34 trillion in 2014 (in current U.S. dollars), with a noticeable acceleration after
China's accession to the WTO in 2001.6 This aggregate expansion was accompanied by substantial variation in trade participation
across firms. The number of firms engaged in exporting more than quadrupled from 62,746 in 2000 to 298,493 in 2014. Average
exports per firm doubled from $3.97 million in 2000 to $7.85 million in 2014, with large standard deviations around these means
($41.5 million in 2000 versus $102.4 million in 2014). On the importing side, we observe a similar pattern of growth: China's total
imports increased from $80.6 billion in 1992 to $1.96 trillion in 2014, while average imports per firm rose from $3.59 million in
2000 to $11.41 million in 2014. By the end of our sample period, China had become the world's largest exporter (with a 12.3%
share of global merchandize trade), as well as the second largest importer (accounting for 10.3% of global merchandize trade).7
We are particularly interested in the operations of firms that are involved in manufacturing value chains. We therefore focus
eventually in our analysis on a subsample that removes wholesalers and retailers, as identified using a standard procedure in the
literature that locates keywords related to trade intermediation in firm names (Ahn et al., 2011). During 2000–2014, the4 This relates to an older literature on double marginalization in pricing decisions.
5 The trade flows in the Chinese customs datasets span different vintages of HS codes. Where necessary, we have used concordance tables provided by the United
Nations Statistical Division to perform crosswalks across different vintages of theHS 6-digit product codes, beforemapping them into the industries in the 2007 Chinese
Input-Output Tables; see the Data Appendix for more details.
6 The average annual growth of Chinese exports increased from 13.7% in 1992–2001 to 16.1% in 2001–2014. Similarly, the average annual growth of Chinese imports
rose from 13.3% in 1992–2001 to 15.4% in 2001–2014.
7 This is based on the value of total merchandize exports (respectively, imports) for each year computed from the CCTS, divided by the value of world merchandize
trade from the World Development Indicators (WDI).
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Table 1
Firm-level production and trade activity, summary statistics.
CCTS 2000-2014 ASIF 1999-2007 ASIF-CCTS 2000-2006
N Mean St Dev N Mean St Dev N Mean St Dev
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: CCTS trade statistics
All Traders 532,704 exporters, 422,818 importers
Log Imports 1,628,806 12.05 2.96
Log Exports 2,385,331 13.15 2.33
Import upstreamness (UM) 1,628,806 3.60 0.83
Export upstreamness (UX) 2,385,331 3.29 0.78
Two-way Traders 259,439 firms 56,282 firms
Log Imports 1,060,154 12.19 3.03 173,951 12.85 2.82
Log Exports 1,060,154 13.77 2.39 173,951 14.13 2.12
Import upstreamness (UM) 1,060,154 3.68 0.76 173,951 3.70 0.75
Export upstreamness (UX) 1,060,154 3.25 0.77 173,951 3.24 0.79
Import-Export Upstreamness (UM - UX) 1,060,154 0.42 0.89 173,951 0.46 0.89
Non-Ordinary Imports / Total Imports 1,060,154 0.55 0.46 173,951 0.71 0.41
Non-Ordinary Exports / Total Exports 1,060,154 0.39 0.45 173,951 0.52 0.44
Processing Imports / Total Imports --- --- --- 173,951 0.59 0.44
Processing Exports / Total Exports --- --- --- 173,951 0.52 0.44
Private Domestic Firm (PVT) 1,060,154 0.31 0.46 173,951 0.14 0.35
State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) 1,060,154 0.05 0.21 173,951 0.05 0.23
Joint Venture (JV) 1,060,154 0.20 0.40 173,951 0.35 0.48
Foreign-Owned MNC Affiliate (MNC) 1,060,154 0.44 0.50 173,951 0.46 0.50
Panel B: ASIF production statistics 541,745 firms
Log Real Total Sales 1,703,955 9.90 1.35 171,325 10.78 1.41
Log Employment 1,875,361 4.72 1.15 173,951 5.49 1.17
Log Total Assets 1,871,630 9.64 1.43 173,875 10.66 1.48
Cap. intensity (Log net fixed assets / worker) 1,859,593 3.51 1.36 173,415 3.73 1.43
Skill intensity (Log average wage) 1,862,573 2.32 0.72 173,714 2.66 0.65
Log Real VA per Worker 1,612,143 3.94 1.29 165,955 4.04 1.21
Log TFPR OP 1,266,402 0.77 0.87 154,936 1.04 0.83
Log TFPR LP 1,641,138 4.30 1.23 154,936 7.16 1.39
Log TFPR ACF 1,266,402 3.47 1.43 1,54,936 3.62 1.27
Log (Age+1) 1,867,812 2.01 0.89 173,675 2.03 0.67
Log Real Value Added 1,612,143 8.66 1.51 165,955 9.54 1.54
Log Real Total Inputs 1,703,762 9.54 1.38 171,252 10.40 1.45
Net Fixed Assets / Total Assets 1,871,630 0.33 2.17 173,875 0.31 0.21
Inventories / Total Assets 1,871,630 0.19 0.17 173,875 0.21 0.16
Profits (Real) 1,717,353 3,193.09 49,029.37 171,487 10,196.97 119,999.19
Profits / Sales 1,703,955 0.05 2.33 171,325 0.07 5.32
Notes: Summary statistics are reported separately for the full CCTS 2000–2014 panel of non-intermediary firm-years (Columns 1–3); the full ASIF 1999–2007 panel
of firms (Columns 4–6); and the baseline matched CCTS-ASIF 2000–2006 panel of non-intermediary firms, in all years in which the firm both imports and exports
(Columns 7–9). All variables are as defined in the text.
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ports and 19.9% of China's imports by value.
Columns 1–3 in Table 1 provide summary statistics for the sample of non-intermediary firms in the 2000–2014 panel. During
this period, 532,704 firms pursued exporting and 422,818 firms pursued importing at least once, while 259,439 firms were two-
way traders (i.e., reporting both exports and imports in the same year) in at least one year. We view the latter – the non-inter-
mediary, two-way traders – as firms that are particularly likely to be engaged in global production chains. These firms generated
log export revenues of 13.77 on average (standard deviation: 2.39), and their mean log imports stood at 12.19 (standard devia-
tion: 3.03). The panel of two-way traders comprises 31% private domestic entities, 5% SOEs, 20% JVs, and 44% MNC affiliates. Of
note, the share of private firms increased sizeably over time, from 6% in 2000 to 48% in 2014, at the expense of the share of
SOEs and JVs. With regard to trade regimes, the average share of “non-ordinary” trade (i.e., processing plus “other” regimes) in
firm exports and imports was 39% and 55%, respectively. (We report this non-ordinary trade share as the data do not distinguish
between processing and “other” trade regimes between 2007 and 2014; we will later use the actual firm-level processing trade
share when we run regressions on the subsample for 2000–2006 that we are able to merge with the manufacturing firm survey
data.)5
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For information on the operations of Chinese firms, we draw on the Annual Survey of Industrial Firms (ASIF) conducted by
China's National Bureau of Statistics, available for 1999–2007. The survey sample covers all state-owned enterprises (regardless
of size), and private companies with sales above 5 million Chinese Yuan.8 The ASIF contains information that would appear in
a typical firm balance sheet. This includes variables that speak to: size (total sales), inputs (employment, average wage, interme-
diate input and material purchases), value added, asset structure (net fixed assets, inventories), and performance (profits). In ad-
dition, we extract from the ASIF each firm's age and main industry of activity (as classified under China's GB/T coding system). We
use the data to construct several standard measures of firm productivity, namely log real value added per worker, as well as rev-
enue-based TFP measures (TFPR) based on production function estimates following the methodologies of Olley and Pakes (1996),
Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), and Ackerberg et al. (2015). More specifically, to construct the TFPR measures, we draw directly on
the ASIF for data on labor inputs (employment) and intermediate input purchases, while we follow Brandt et al. (2012) to com-
pute a firm-level real capital stock series. The production function estimation is performed for each TFPR measure at the GB/T
2-digit industry level (30 categories). (Please see the Data Appendix for further details on the construction of the firm productivity
measures.)
Our empirical analysis critically relies on combining firm-level trade and balance-sheet data from the CCTS and ASIF respec-
tively. While each dataset is organized around company registration numbers, they do not share unique firm identifiers. Following
standard practice in the literature, we merge the customs records with the industrial survey using an algorithm that matches
firms' names and contact information, including addresses and phone numbers.9 This procedure delivers a large and broadly rep-
resentative sample. We focus on a baseline matched ASIF-CCTS sample spanning 2000–2006, during which the coverage of firms
and key variables in the ASIF is at its best. For 2000–2006, we are able to obtain ASIF balance-sheet data for 30% of the firms in
the CCTS; these firms mediate 51% of all exports and 43% of all imports recorded in the CCTS during these years. Conversely, we
locate CCTS trade transactions for 52% of all ASIF firms with positive exports; these account for about 80% of the total export value
reported in the ASIF balance sheets.
Columns 4–6 in Table 1 summarize the variation in firm size, inputs, productivity, and performance in the full ASIF panel for
1999–2007, for key measures that will feature in our regressions. At the same time, Columns 7–9 report the trade and production
statistics for the matched ASIF-CCTS panel of non-intermediary firms that are two-way traders in 2000–2006. Overall, the
matched firms tend to be larger and more productive than the average firm in the full ASIF panel, suggesting that the merge is
capturing firms that account for the majority of economic activity in the ASIF. The matched firms also tend to exhibit larger im-
port and export volumes than the full CCTS sample (Columns 1–3), though the average upstreamness of the firm-level trade flows
(based on the upstreamness measures to be defined below) is very similar. (Appendix Table 1 reports unconditional two-way cor-
relations among the key firm indicators of productivity, size, and experience.)
2.3. Industry upstreamness
We use Chinese Input-Output (IO) Tables and the methodology developed in Fally (2012) and Antràs et al. (2012) to construct
a measure of the production line position of different industries. Conceptually, the upstreamness of industry i, Ui, is a weighted
average of the number of stages from final demand at which i enters as an input in production processes. In an economy with





























þ . . . , ð1Þwhere Yi is gross output in industry i, and Fi is the value of that output that goes directly to final uses (i.e., consumption or in-
vestment). dij is the direct requirements coefficient in the Chinese IO Tables, this being the value of i used as an input to produce
one yuan worth of industry j output.10
The formula in (1) assigns a weight of 1 to the share of industry-i output that goes directly to final use, a weight of 2 to the
share that is channeled to final use through exactly one other industry, and so on. Though expressed as an infinite sum in (1),
Antràs et al. (2012) show that Ui can be evaluated in a few succinct matrix algebra steps. In particular, let D denote the matrix
of direct requirement coefficients, namely: the N-by-N matrix whose i-th row and j-th column is equal to dij. Likewise, define F
to be a column vector whose i-th entry is Fi. The numerator of (1) is then exactly equal to the i-th entry of [I − D]−2F, whereis equivalent to 0.6million USD, based on the bilateral exchange rate in 2005. The ASIF data are cleaned following the steps inWang and Yu (2012), to remove:
s in non-manufacturing industries (i.e., retaining only firms with 2-digit GB/T industry code in 13–43); (b) observations with negative values for output, sales,
, capital, total assets, total fixed assets, wages, or intermediate inputs, and observations with zero employees; and (c) observations with total assets less than
ed assets or total liquid assets, or with total sales less than exports.
Wang and Yu (2012) for a detailed description of the matching procedure.
owingAntràs et al. (2012),we scale dijby the factor Yi/(Yi−Xi+Mi−NIi),whereXi−Mi is equal to the net exports of i, andNIi is the net change in inventories of
d in the IO Tables. This correction accounts for industry-i flows across country borders, aswell as into and out of inventories; as Antràs et al. (2012) show, this is
ection term implied by a proportionality assumption, that these industry-iflows are used as inputs across industries j in the same proportion aswhat is observed
stic cross-industry flows.
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D. Chor, K. Manova and Z. Yu Journal of International Economics 130 (2021) 103445I is the N-by-N identity matrix. The denominator of (1), Yi, is in turn equal to the i-th entry of [I − D]−1F, which is the familiar
Leontief inverse matrix formula for industry gross output.11,12
By construction, one can see from (1) that Ui ≥ 1, with equality if and only if all of industry i’s output goes directly to final use.
If instead industry i tends to enter into production chains as an intermediate input multiple stages prior to final demand, this
would be reflected in a larger value of Ui. For example, rubber can be used directly as a final product (one step to final consumers)
or in the manufacture of tyres that are in turn assembled into cars that are then sold as a final product (three steps to final con-
sumers). By contrast, apparel comprises mostly final goods (one step to final consumers) and rarely serves as an intermediate
input to other sectors. Rubber would thus have a higher Ui value than apparel.
Table 2 reports summary statistics for Ui based on the 2007 China IO Tables, which contains a relatively detailed set of 135
industries. The measure of industry upstreamness ranges from 1 to 5.86, with a mean of 3.16 and a standard deviation of 1.12.
As reported in the lower panel of the table, the 10 most upstream industries comprise mainly sectors involved in the extraction
and processing of raw materials; on the other hand, the 10 least upstream industries include service sectors with a large share of
direct sales to consumers. We will proceed to use these measures of industry upstreamness that have been benchmarked to the
Chinese economy to describe the production line position of China-based firms. Note that we document similar trends when using
the disaggregate US 2002 IO Tables (with 426 industries) as an alternative benchmark.
2.4. Firm production line position
We apply the above industry measure of upstreamness, Ui, to characterize the production line position of each firm in the
CCTS. We compute a weighted-average upstreamness of firm f’s imports (UftM) and exports (UftX), as well as the difference between





































Ui: ð2ÞSince the CCTS reports trade flows by HS product, we use concordance tables between HS product codes and Chinese IO in-
dustry categories to obtain the value of each firm's exports (Xfit) and imports (Mfit) in IO industry i in year t. Note that Xft =
∑i=1N Xfit and Mft = ∑i=1N Mfit are firm f’s total exports and imports respectively, so the weights in (2) are proportional to the ex-
port (respectively, import) share of each industry in the firm's overall trade profile.13
We interpret UftM and UftX as summary measures of the global production line position of the firm. In practice, global production
processes can be structured in complex ways, with some portions featuring sequences of stages (“snakes”), while other segments
might be set up in a manner resembling a hub-and-spoke (“spiders”, in the lingo of Baldwin and Venables, 2013). The measures
in (2) seek to capture how firms are situated within these production processes, even in the absence of granular information
about how each firm is structuring and locating its specific operations. Instead, (2) taps on the rich Chinese customs data on
firm-level imports and exports, and combines these with upstreamness measures for a relatively disaggregate set of industries,
in order to infer – in an admittedly stylized manner – the average positioning of a firm's activities within GVCs relative to final
demand. Particularly for non-intermediary firms that both import and export, one can view UftM as capturing the average
upstreamness of materials and inputs that are brought into China by the firm, and UftX as reflecting the average upstreamness
of the semi-finished or finished goods sold to buyers worldwide. We view the difference, UftM − UftX, as informative of the span
of production stages that the firm oversees or coordinates within China; this could take the form of direct in-house production,
but it does not exclude the possibility of outsourcing to other domestic suppliers.14
In Columns 1–3 of Table 1, we report summary statistics for UftM, UftX, and UftM − UftX, across firm-years with positive exports and
imports in the CCTS 2000–2014 panel (restricted to non-intermediary firms only). The mean upstreamness of firm imports is 3.68,
while the corresponding mean upstreamness of firm exports is 3.25, implying an average span of 0.42 production stages. There is
significant dispersion around these means, with the standard deviations equal to 0.76, 0.77, and 0.89 respectively. As noted earlier,
these metrics are very similar in the matched sample of non-intermediary two-way traders with both CCTS customs and ASIF pro-





ij= dij(Yj/Yi) is the share of industry-i’s output that is sold to industry j. Intuitively, industry i can be viewed as being one stage more upstream than a weighted
the industries j that purchase i as an input.
alsoMiller and Termushoev (2017) and Antràs and Chor (2018) for a detailed exposition of the definition and construction of this upstreamnessmeasurewhen
d to the context of multi-country IO tables, such as the World Input-Output Database (WIOD).
rinciple, one could use industry upstreamness values that vary by source country – calculated from the respective countries' IO Tables –when constructing the
el upstreamnessmeasures in (2), in order to reflect potential differences across countries in local technological and production conditions. In practice, however,
ot pursue this approach as currently available cross-country datasets of IO Tables tend to feature harmonized industry categories that are relatively coarse, com-
the level of industry detail in the Chinese and US IO Tables. For what it is worth, Antràs et al. (2012) report a pervasive positive correlation between industry
mness values computed for different countries in the OECD STAN database; this features 41 industries, of which only 13 are in manufacturing.
e generally, given the weighted-average nature of the firm-level upstreamness measures, there should be no presumption that all production steps that are
Uft
M and UftX stages from final demand are actually physically performed by the firm within China.
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Table 2
Industry-level upstreamness, 2007 IO tables.
25th Median 75th Mean St Dev
Panel A: Industry upstreamness
All 135 industries 2.343 3.060 3.950 3.161 1.118
Primary (IO industries: 1 to 10) 3.331 4.343 5.345 4.302 1.176
Manufacturing (IO industries: 11 to 91) 2.498 3.060 4.104 3.276 1.008
Services (IO industries: 92 to 135) 1.720 2.966 3.480 2.691 1.076
Panel B: Ten most and least upstream industries
Nonferrous metal mining (IO9) 5.861
Oil & gas exploration (IO7) 5.508
Basic chemical raw materials (IO39) 5.375
Coal mining & washing (IO6) 5.345
Scrap waste (IO91) 5.256
Chemical fiber (IO47) 5.162
Ferrous metal mining (IO8) 5.114
Coking (IO38) 5.095
Pipeline transportation (IO101) 5.023
Nonferrous metal alloying & smelting (IO61) 4.877
–
Resident services (IO124) 1.382
Software (IO107) 1.275
Convenience food (IO18) 1.269
Health (IO127) 1.269
Education (IO126) 1.212
Public facilities management (IO123) 1.074
Sports (IO133) 1.060
Construction (IO95) 1.058
Public administration & social organizations (IO135) 1.026
Social welfare (IO129) 1.000
Notes: Computed from Chinese Input-Output Tables for 2007.
D. Chor, K. Manova and Z. Yu Journal of International Economics 130 (2021) 103445Before proceeding, it is useful to note several caveats about UftM and UftX. While we observe the detailed product composition of
a firm's exports, and can deduce the value of its domestic sales by subtracting its total exports from total sales (where available in
the ASIF), we do not have data on the firm's domestic sales by product. An analogous comment applies on the input side, as we
do not directly observe the product breakdown of a firm's material inputs in the ASIF. Thus, UftM and UftX should be seen as good
reflections of the upstreamness of a firm's overall operations, only to the extent that these are well-represented by the product
composition of the firm's imports and exports. Note further that the ASIF data do not provide information on whether the mate-
rial inputs are being purchased through intra-firm or arm's length transactions. We are thus not able to draw sharp conclusions
on the basis of this data about the extent to which vertical integration of the supply chain is being pursued relative to outsourcing.
3. China's global production line position
3.1. Aggregate trends
We start by examining key trends in China's global production line position at the aggregate level over the 1992–2014 period.
We characterize this in each year by the weighted-average upstreamness of China's imports and exports, UChina,tM and UChina,tX , as












Ui: ð3ÞHere, Ui is the industry upstreamness measure from (1) based on the 2007 China IO Tables;
Mit
Mt
is the value of imports classified
as being from industry i expressed as a share of China's total imports in year t, while XitXt is the industry-i export share. In practice,
for 2000–2014, we compute (3) by taking a weighted average of the firm-level upstreamness measures defined earlier in (2)










UXft : ð4ÞIt is straightforward to see that (4) is equivalent to (3), since Mit = ∑fMfit and Xit = ∑fXfit.
We report the aggregate trends we uncover in a series of stylized facts:8
Fig. 1. Trends in China's aggregate trade and global production line position. Notes: Authors' own calculations based on Chinese Customs Trade Statistics.
Aggregates are based on data at the province or city level for 1992–1999 and data at the firm level for 2000–2014. Information on China's GDP used in Panel B
is from the World Development Indicators.
D. Chor, K. Manova and Z. Yu Journal of International Economics 130 (2021) 103445Macro Trend 1: Over 1992–2014, Chinese imports became significantly more upstream, while Chinese exports became slightly more
downstream, in relation to sources of final demand.
Fig. 1A traces the evolution of UChina,tM and UChina,tX over the entire 23-year sample period. Two features stand out: First, Chinese
imports are persistently more upstream than Chinese exports. This reflects the tendency for China-based firms to use imported
inputs when producing goods that are then exported to foreign markets, and is consistent with – but not exclusively driven by
– the important role that processing trade has played in the Chinese economy. Note that there is nothing that preordains that
a country's imports will necessarily be more upstream on average than its exports. For example, countries rich in natural re-
sources – and that export raw materials in exchange for imports of final goods – tend to exhibit the opposite pattern.15
Second, the production line position of China's exports remained fairly stable between 1992 and 2014, with a slight decline in
UChina,t
X from 3.29 to 3.21. By contrast, aggregate Chinese imports became dramatically more upstream, with UChina,tM rising from an
initial value of 3.57 to 4.02. This latter rise was not driven simply by increased imports of agricultural or mineral commodities:
When we re-compute (3) using only IO industries in manufacturing – with the weights being the corresponding share of
manufacturing industry i in total manufacturing trade flows – we find that China's import upstreamness rose, albeit less sharply
from 3.48 in 1992 to 3.74 in 2014 (see Appendix Fig. 1A); we obtain a similar pattern if we instead drop the entire section of HS
codes for mineral products, i.e., Section V, HS 25–27, which includes petroleum products, when computing aggregate
upstreamness (Appendix Fig. 1B). Separately, we have checked that the upward trend in UChina,tM was not due to China's increased
purchases of capital goods and equipment from abroad: Dropping products classified as capital goods under the UN Broad Eco-
nomic Categories (BEC) system, we still find that import upstreamness rose from 3.82 in 1992 to 4.12 in 2014 (Appendix Fig.
1C).16 This “fanning out” pattern is moreover robust when UChina,tM and UChina,tX are constructed using industry upstreamness mea-
sures drawn from the 2002 US IO tables (Antràs et al., 2012), in place of the Ui measures from the 2007 Chinese IO tables (Ap-
pendix Fig. 1D).17
Fig. 1A suggests that over time, Chinese firms have either developed the capability and/or found it profitable to perform more
upstream stages of production processes, so that they have come to span wider segments of GVCs. This is broadly consistent with
the observation that the domestic value added embedded in Chinese exports has been rising over time (Kee and Tang, 2016), to
the extent that spanning more stages implies a greater use of Chinese factors of production. The rise in China's import
upstreamness was moreover concentrated in the period prior to 2008, and tapered off subsequently. This is noteworthy, as it co-
incides with the onset of a slowdown in the growth rate of Chinese trade relative to its GDP. As Fig. 1B illustrates, the ratio of
China's merchandize trade (exports plus imports) to GDP increased sharply following China's WTO accession in 2001, reaching
about 70% in 2006.18 The years since have seen a decline in this ratio that has persisted past the end of the Global Financial Crisis,15 Using trade data from 2002, Chor (2014) reports that the weighted-average upstreamness of imports was lower than that of exports for such resource-rich coun-
tries as Australia, New Zealand, and Brunei.
16 Appendix Table 2 lists the 20 HS products that experienced the fastest import growth rates between 2002 and 2006, among the subset of products with above-me-
dian upstreamness values. This list features a mix of agriculture-related products (e.g., Buckwheat, Fertilizers), minerals (e.g., Ethylene, Liquefied natural gas), and in-
termediate inputs inmanufacturing (e.g., Coir yarn, Hot-rolled bars and rods), suggesting that none of these broad categories of products was responsible on its own for
the overall rise in the upstreamness of China's imports. Note that we focus on 2002–2006, as product codes are consistently recorded in the 2002 HS vintage during
these years; this period also coincides with the bulk of the rise in aggregate import upstreamness.
17 The mean upstreamness value across industries in the 2002 US IO Tables is 2.09, lower than that in the 2007 Chinese IO Tables. This accounts for the lower values
reflected on the vertical axes in Appendix Figure 1D.
18 The value of China's aggregatemerchandize trade is calculated directly from the customs data, while the data on China's GDP in current US dollars is from theWorld
Development Indicators.
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Fig. 2. Trends in aggregate upstreamness by customs trade regime. Notes: Authors' own calculations based on Chinese Customs Trade Statistics. Aggregates are
based on the trade regime status of each trade transaction. Non-ordinary trade flows combine processing and “other” trade regimes.
D. Chor, K. Manova and Z. Yu Journal of International Economics 130 (2021) 103445prompting observers to label this as a structural break in the manner of China's engagement in international trade. This has been
attributed (among other causes) to the rebalancing of China's economy towards domestic demand, or a possible peaking out in
supply chain offshoring from developed countries to China (IMF, 2016; Frankel, 2016). What our first Macro Trend indicates is
that these broader economic developments were accompanied by a steadying in the global production line position of China's im-
ports (and exports).
We have found the above “fanning out pattern” of Chinese import and export upstreamness to be present in various subsam-
ple cuts of the customs data. Fig. 2A plots the weighted-average upstreamness of Chinese trade flows, separately for non-ordinary
trade (dashed lines) and ordinary trade (solid lines). The pattern we observe for ordinary trade mirrors closely that for aggregate
trade flows seen in Fig. 1A: Ordinary exports and imports had similar upstreamness values at the start of the sample period, but
ordinary imports became almost a full production stage more upstream than ordinary exports by 2014. Along with this, the
upstreamness of ordinary imports into China rose more sharply than that of imports brought in under non-ordinary trade
regimes. That said, this gap can be attributed largely to imports of mineral products (which tend to have high Ui values), as
the upstreamness of ordinary imports falls back in line with that of non-ordinary imports once HS codes 25–27 are excluded
(Fig. 2B).19
Fig. 3A performs a similar exercise looking across firms by ownership types. There is a clear and stable ranking with the im-
ports and exports of state-owned enterprises (SOE, solid lines) systematically more upstream than the corresponding trade flows
of private domestic firms (PVT, dashed lines), which in turn are more upstream than those of joint ventures and fully-owned mul-
tinational affiliates (JV/MNC, dot-dashed lines). Over time, there has been an increase in the import upstreamness of all three firm
types, with the climb most distinct for SOEs. As Fig. 3B shows though, this gap between the import upstreamness of SOEs and
other firms is reduced when one removes mineral products (HS codes 25–27). This is consistent with the increased role that
SOEs have played in securing imports of mineral resources as inputs for China's industrial activities.20
3.2. From aggregate to firm upstreamness
The above trends in the evolution of China's export and import upstreamness can arise from changes among continuing
firms and/or changes in the set of active trading firms. This motivates us to undertake a decomposition of the observed changes
in UChina,tM and UChina,tX over time, to better understand the firm-level sources of these aggregate shifts.



























ð5Þhave also compared the global production line positioning of firms classified as trade intermediaries versus non-intermediaries in Appendix Figure 2A. The pat-
ibited across these two subsets offirmswas similar, with a clear rise in import upstreamness over the sample period, evenwhile export upstreamness remained
eparately, Appendix Figure 2B points to a similar trend of rising import upstreamness, albeit slightly less pronounced, even whenwe focus just on the non-in-
ary firms that are in our merged ASIF-CCTS sample for 2000–2006.
t al. (2015) document how themonopoly power of China's state-owned enterprises in upstream rawmaterials industries has expanded over time, including in
emicals and electricity generation.
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Fig. 3. Trends in Aggregate Upstreamness by Firm Ownership Type. Notes: Authors' own calculations based on Chinese Customs Trade Statistics. Ownership type is
deduced from the sixth digit of CCTS firm codes: “SOE” = state-owned enterprises, “PVT/OTH” = private and all other enterprises, “JV/MNC” = joint venture and
multinational companies.
D. Chor, K. Manova and Z. Yu Journal of International Economics 130 (2021) 103445where the firms f have been exactly partitioned into three subsets: (i) those that report imports in both year t − 1 and t, CtM
(“continuers”); (ii) those that do not report imports in year t − 1, but do so in year t, ENtM (“entrants”); and (iii) those that report
imports in year t − 1, but not in year t, EXtM (“exiters”). The terms in the first line of (5) are changes in aggregate import




UMft ) and those that cease to do so (−∑ f∈EXMt
M f ,t−1
Mt−1
UMf ,t−1); to be clear, these capture instances of entry into or exit
from importing, which need not be episodes of entry into or exit from production entirely. The terms on the second line of (5)
stem in turn from the intensive margin. Here, ∑ f∈CMt
M f ,t−1
Mt−1
ΔUMft reflects the contribution of within-firm changes in upstreamness
over time – which arise from changes in the mix of products a firm imports – holding the firm import weights constant at their





UMft , picks up the role of shifts across continuing firms in each firm f’s impor-
tance as an importer. An analogous formula to (5) holds on the exporting side.
Implementing (5) on the full CCTS firm-level panel, we obtain:
Macro Trend 2: Over the 2000–2014 period, the rise in China's aggregate import upstreamness stems from: (i) the entry of firms
whose imports are more upstream on average than exiting firms; and (ii) a rise in import upstreamness within continuing firms. The
modest decrease in China's aggregate export upstreamness reflects both changes within and reallocations across continuing firms.
Table 3 summarizes the main findings from this decomposition exercise. We report the changes separately for 2000–2006 and
for 2006–2014, bearing in mind that 2006 was when China's trade-to-GDP ratio reached its peak (Fig. 1B). Note that the additive
nature of the decomposition means that we can simply add up the year-to-year changes corresponding to each term in (5) to
obtain the contributions of each respective term over an extended period. Focusing first on import flows, the overall increase
in UChina,tM during 2000–2006 (+0.137) is explained by two forces: the net extensive margin (+0.734), which implies new im-
porters were shipping more upstream products into China than exiting importers; and the within-firm intensive margin
(+0.190), so that the product mix of imports was also becoming more upstream for continuing importers.21 These effects are off-
set to some extent by the negative cross-firm term on the intensive margin (−0.788), as most individual firms saw their shares
in China's total imports fall during this period. Turning to the export side, we find that the modest fall in UChina,tX between
2000 and 2006 (−0.015) is accounted for by within-firm shifts (−0.009) and cross-firm changes (−0.793) among continuing ex-
porters (i.e., both terms on the intensive margin), the latter in particular reflecting how individual firms were in general becoming
smaller as a share of China's total exports during this period of rapid export growth. The pattern of these changes for UChina,tM and
UChina,t
X respectively are qualitatively similar prior to and after 2006, though they taper off in magnitude in the later period.
The findings from Table 3 indicate that the within-firm changes on the intensive margin resemble the broader “fanning out”
pattern seen for China's aggregate trade flows (from Fig. 1A), with a clear rise in import upstreamness and a modest decline in
export upstreamness over time. We shed further light on these within-firm shifts with:21 We have briefly explored howmuch of this extensivemargin adjustment can be attributed to firm entry into production (rather than entry into importing per se).
To address this, we restrict ourselves to the ASIF-CCTSmerged sample from 2000 to 2006, since the information on a firm's year of establishment is only available in the
ASIF. In theASIF-CCTS, the change in aggregate import upstreamness accounted for byfirmentry into importing is+1.028. Of this, the changewhich coincideswith firm




Decomposition of changes over time in aggregate upstreamness.
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin Overall Change
Firm Entry Firm Exit Net Change in Firm U Change in Firm Shares Net
ΔUMChina,t
2000–2006 1.220 −0.486 0.734 0.190 −0.788 −0.597 0.137
2006–2014 1.368 −0.856 0.512 0.094 −0.524 −0.430 0.082
ΔUXChina,t
2000–2006 1.189 −0.402 0.787 −0.009 −0.793 −0.802 −0.015




2000–2006 0.031 −0.084 −0.053 0.199 0.005 0.204 0.151
2006–2014 −0.254 0.038 −0.215 0.116 0.208 0.324 0.109
Notes: Based on the exact decomposition of changes in aggregate upstreamness, presented in eq. (5). The “net” extensive margin column sums up the contribu-
tions from firm entry and firm exit in the preceding two columns. The “net” intensive margin is the sum of the contributions in the preceding two columns stem-
ming from: (i) changes in firm-level upstreamness, holding constant initial firm trade share weights; and (ii) changes in the firm trade share weights, holding
constant firm-level upstreamness. The “Overall change” column is the sum of the net extensive and net intensive margin contributions. Firm entry and firm
exit refer specifically to entry/exit from importing/exporting, which may occur even when the firm does not enter/exit from production.
D. Chor, K. Manova and Z. Yu Journal of International Economics 130 (2021) 103445Macro Trend 3: Within firms over time, imports became significantly more upstream, exports became moderately more proximate
to final demand, and the implied span of production stages performed within China increased during 2000–2014.













¼ α þ∑2014t¼2001αtYEARt þ φf þ εft : ð6ÞThe outcome variable is in turn the average upstreamness of a firm's imports (UftM), the average upstreamness of a firm's ex-
ports (UftX), and the difference between these two (UftM − UftX), as defined earlier in (2). We quantify common time trends in firms'
global production line position by estimating coefficients αt for a full set of year dummies YEARt, conditional on firm fixed effects,
φf. The αt’s for 2001 ≤ t ≤ 2014 thus capture average cumulative changes (relative to 2000) based on all firms that are active in
year t. We conservatively cluster the standard errors by firm, to account for possible correlated shocks within firms over time in
the εft error terms.22
In Columns 1–2 of Table 4, we estimate (6) for UftM and UftX respectively using the full CCTS panel for 2000–2014. Columns 3–4
run these same regressions after excluding trade intermediaries, given that the import and export flows of these companies are
often not tied to actual production decisions made by these firms. In both the full CCTS sample and the non-intermediary subsam-
ple, we find that the export upstreamness of firms declined steadily but moderately between 2000 and 2014, while the
upstreamness of their imports rose quickly. The point estimates for the αt’s are significant across these four columns for almost
all years, and typically rise in absolute value over time.
In the rest of Table 4, we further restrict the sample to non-intermediary firm-year observations that record a positive volume
of both exports and imports, these being firms most likely to be engaged in GVCs. The import upstreamness of these non-inter-
mediary two-way traders also increased dramatically during 2000–2014 (Column 5). On the other hand, their exports became
only slightly more proximate to final demand; this trend tapered off after 2009, so that by 2014, the average level of firms' export
upstreamness was not statistically distinguishable from that in 2000 (see the point estimate of α2014 in Column 6). For a repre-
sentative firm, the cumulative changes in UftM and UftX over this period were 0.1992 and 0.0001 respectively, from average starting
levels of 3.6961 and 3.2119 in 2000. As a result, the gap between the upstreamness of firms' imports and exports widened, im-
plying an expansion in the span of stages performed within China of 0.1991 on average, or more than 41% up from the initial av-
erage value of UftM − UftX of 0.4842 (Column 7).23 In Appendix Table 3, we show that these trends in firms' production line position
are robust even when we control for the number of HS 6-digit products that the firm imports and/or the number of HS 6-digit
products that it exports in each year. There is a modest reduction in the αt point estimates, but these still imply a cumulative av-
erage change in the span of stages, UftM − UftX, of 0.1594. This suggests that the expansion along the production chain within firms
reflects the shifting of production steps into China, rather than changes in input and output product scope per se.24
Fig. 4 illustrates these within-firm changes over time in the span of stages performed in China, through several kernel density
plots of UftM − UftX. We focus on the set of all non-intermediary firms that were two-way traders throughout the entire duration of
our sample period; we refer to these firms in Fig. 4 as “survivors” . These firms tend to span more production stages as they age,
as can be seen from the rightward shift in the distribution of UftM − UftX for “survivors” between 2000 and 2014. One can compareegression results in the paper are unaffected if we instead use heteroskedasticity-robust (but unclustered) standard errors.
obtain very similar results ifwewere to restrict the regressions to the subsample of non-intermediary firms that were “two-way traders” in every year between
d 2014, or in every year between 2000 and 2006 (available on request).
estimates from Appendix Table 3 indicate that importing further upstream is associated with a smaller number of imported HS6 products. At the same time,
hose exports are more proximate to final demand (i.e., are less upstream) tend to export more products. However, the implied economic magnitude of each
al imported (respectively, exported) product on firms' production staging is relatively small.
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Table 4
Chinese firms' global production line position over time.
Full Sample All Non-intermediaries Two-Way Non-intermediaries
Dep variable UftM UftX UftM UftX UftM UftX UftM - UftX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Constant 3.4602*** 3.3053*** 3.4209*** 3.2981*** 3.5512*** 3.2522*** 0.2990***
Year 2001 −0.0025 −0.0009 0.0004 −0.0006 −0.0009 −0.0005 −0.0004
Year 2002 0.0053 −0.0005 0.0114*** 0.0020 0.0032 0.0013 0.0019
Year 2003 0.0476*** −0.0027 0.0603*** 0.0009 0.0332*** −0.0004 0.0337***
Year 2004 0.0842*** −0.0019 0.0967*** −0.0010 0.0617*** −0.0018 0.0635***
Year 2005 0.1237*** −0.0028 0.1408*** −0.0018 0.0898*** −0.0043* 0.0940***
Year 2006 0.1454*** −0.0091*** 0.1680*** −0.0044** 0.1088*** −0.0045* 0.1133***
Year 2007 0.1864*** −0.0103*** 0.2161*** −0.0101*** 0.1526*** −0.0004 0.1530***
Year 2008 0.2028*** −0.0168*** 0.2382*** −0.0162*** 0.1708*** −0.0098*** 0.1806***
Year 2009 0.2225*** −0.0161*** 0.2626*** −0.0151*** 0.1902*** −0.0086*** 0.1987***
Year 2010 0.2151*** −0.0155*** 0.2566*** −0.0146*** 0.1809*** −0.0044 0.1853***
Year 2011 0.2151*** −0.0132*** 0.2578*** −0.0124*** 0.1798*** −0.0034 0.1832***
Year 2012 0.2360*** −0.0082*** 0.2807*** −0.0065*** 0.1924*** 0.0021 0.1904***
Year 2013 0.2400*** −0.0073*** 0.2862*** −0.0061*** 0.1963*** 0.0037 0.1926***
Year 2014 0.2414*** −0.0111*** 0.2876*** −0.0102*** 0.1992*** 0.0001 0.1991***
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 1,705,235 2,575,655 1,491,871 2,269,604 982,737 982,737 982,737
R2 0.7328 0.8798 0.7432 0.8931 0.7163 0.9029 0.7276
Notes: The sample comprises different subsets of firm-year observations in the 2000–2014 CCTS panel; the “Two-Way Non-intermediaries” subsample in Columns
5–7 comprises all non-intermediary firms, in all years in which the firm both imports and exports. All regressions include firm fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered by firm; these are not reported in the table for brevity (available on request). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels.
Fig. 4. Patterns in Firm Upstreamness: “Survivors” vs. “New” Two-Way Traders. Notes: Authors' own calculations based on Chinese Customs Trade Statistics. Kernel
density plots of the difference between import and export upstreamness at the firm level. The sample comprises 5646 “survivor” firms that export and import in
each year in 2000–2014, and 26,450 “new” two-way traders that reported export and import activity in 2014 but not in 2013.
D. Chor, K. Manova and Z. Yu Journal of International Economics 130 (2021) 103445these “survivors” in 2014 against firms that were “new” two-way traders in 2014, these being non-intermediary firms that both
export and import in 2014 but not in 2013. The kernel density plot of UftM − UftX for the new two-way traders is concentrated more
tightly around its peak value, confirming that these firms tend to perform a narrower span of production stages than firms that
have continuously been two-way traders for many prior years.25
Together, the patterns in Fig. 4 and Table 4 suggest that Chinese firms that are new to importing or exporting typically begin
by conducting fewer production steps than existing traders, and then gradually expand the scope of their production stages as
they survive and grow. We pick up on this theme in the next section, with a more detailed firm-level empirical analysis.25 We performed a Kolgomorov-Smirnov test to compare the distributions of UftM − UftX for: (i) “survivors” in 2000 against “survivors” in 2014; and (ii) “survivors” in
2014 against “new” two-way traders in 2014. All tests comfortably rejected the null hypothesis of identical distributions, with p-values smaller than 0.0001.We obtain
virtually identical findings if we were to alternatively define non-intermediary firms that were two-way traders in both 2000 and 2014 (but not necessarily in all years
in between) to be “survivors”, and non-intermediary firms that were two-way traders in 2014, but not in 2000, to be “new” two-way traders (Appendix Figure 3). We
also provide kernel density plots of the distributions for UftM and UftX separately (Appendix Figure 4). These reveal that the shift over time in UftM − UftX for “survivors” is
driven by their imports becoming more upstream.
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4.1. Estimation approach
We examine how the global production line position of Chinese firms evolves over time with their operations and perfor-
mance using data from the matched ASIF-CCTS panel. We first analyze how productivity, size and experience correlate with im-
port and export upstreamness at the firm level. Second, we document how firms' global production line position varies with the
structure of firms' inputs, costs, assets, and profits.
Our goal is twofold. On the one hand, we want to agnostically establish novel and robust stylized facts that paint a coherent
picture of how key firm attributes and performance metrics co-evolve with the global production line position of Chinese firms. At
the same time, we also aim to inform the determinants and consequences of firms' participation in GVCs, and to offer a concep-
tual framework that can rationalize the empirical patterns through the lens of profit maximization. In Section 5, we will interpret
the first set of results in terms of drivers of firms' production line position, and the second set of results in terms of its correlates
and outcomes.










¼ α þ βZft þ ΓΩft þ φf þ φst þ εft , and ð7Þ
Yft ,Πft
n o
¼ α þ β UMft ,UXft ,UMft −UXft
n o
þ ΓΩft þ φf þ φst þ εft: ð8ÞIn regression (7), the outcome variable is in turn one of the three measures of firms' participation in GVCs: the average
upstreamness of firm imports, UftM, the average upstreamness of firm exports, UftX, and the difference between these two, UftM −
Uft
X. The main variables of interest on the right-hand side, Zft, will be measures of firm productivity, size, and experience, which
we view as potential drivers of a firm's decision over the span of stages to be engaged in. Our baseline findings presented in Sec-
tion 4.2.1 come from estimating (7) via ordinary least squares (OLS). We also report results in Section 4.2.2 where we adopt an
instrumental variable for firm productivity, constructed as a predicted foreign demand shock that a firm is plausibly exposed to.
In regression (8), we instead examine how various aspects of a firm's operations, Yft – pertaining to value added, input pur-
chases, costs incurred, and asset structure – correlate with its global production line position (Section 4.3). We also consider
how performance metrics related to firm profits, Πft, vary with UftM − UftX. We view the Yft and Πft on the left-hand side of (8)
to be variables that are either decided upon jointly with a firm's choice over its span of production stages (such as input pur-
chases) or outcomes of that decision (such as profits). The results we present for (8) are OLS estimates, so these should be viewed
as informative partial correlations of how these features of the firm move in tandem with its span of stages.
In both (7) and (8), we absorb permanent observed and unobserved firm characteristics with firm fixed effects, φf. Likewise,
we control for sector-specific supply and demand shocks with sector-by-year dummies, φst, where s denotes the GB/T 4-digit in-
dustry (up to 480 categories) of firm f’s primary activity as designated in the ASIF. We include also several time-varying firm char-
acteristics, Ωft, namely physical and human capital intensity, proxied respectively by log net fixed assets per worker and the log
average wage; all results are robust to omitting these controls for factor intensities, and their inclusion has minimal effect on the
coefficient estimates of interest. For each firm characteristic in Zft, Yft and Πft, we drop the tail 1% of observations across firms (at
both tails) from the regression sample given the skew that is often present in these variables.26 All standard errors are clustered
by firm to allow for correlated shocks within firms over time.
The φf’s account for intransient variation in institutional and market conditions across firm locations (i.e., Chinese cities, or spe-
cial economic zones), such as labor costs, capital availability, infrastructure, and contract enforcement. These further subsume any
such differences across firm ownership types. Since the φf’s capture firms' primary industry of activity, they also control for sys-
tematic cross-sector differences in available production techniques and factor intensities, while the φst’s control flexibly for poten-
tial time trends in these sector-level forces.
The coefficient of interest, β, is therefore identified from the variation within firms over time, and reflects how changes in their
supply chain position are associated with changes in their attributes and outcomes. Relating this back to the decomposition in
Table 3, this is the variation captured by the intensive margin term that focuses on within-firm changes in UftM and UftX. We
work primarily with these within-firm specifications, as these allow us to include a relatively thorough set of fixed effects to ab-
sorb potential omitted variables. (We also briefly present some results from a specification that instead teases out patterns in the
variation across firms; see Appendix Table 6.)
We report results from running (7) and (8), when using firms in the matched ASIF-CCTS panel that are non-intermediary two-
way traders.27 The sample has about 175,000 observations, smaller than the roughly 1,000,000 firm-year observations available
for the same category of firms in the 2000–2014 CCTS panel (Columns 5–7, Table 4). Recall that this is because the ASIF data
spans a shorter time period, and the firm match between the CCTS and the ASIF is comprehensive but incomplete. Importantly,example, we drop firmswith a log real value added perworker smaller than its 1st percentile and larger than its 99th percentile when exploring the correlation
roductivity variable with firm-level upstreamness. The results are similar if we winsorize, rather than censor, the tail 1% values for each variable.
two-way non-intermediaries account for more than 92% of both the export and import value recorded for the firms that are in thematched ASIF-CCTS sample.
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matched firms in 2000–2006 does not affect the conclusions drawn from the regressions that otherwise use the full 2000–2014
CCTS panel (e.g., from Table 4). We have also confirmed that all results hold when we broaden the ASIF-CCTS sample by relaxing
the condition that a firm be a two-way trader (available on request). We document the findings that follow as a series of Firm
Facts.
4.2. Firm productivity, size and experience
We first provide evidence that firms' global production line position evolved systematically with their productivity, size and
experience during this period of rapid trade liberalization for China. We estimate (7) using various measures of these three
firm attributes as the variable of interest, Zft.
Firm Fact 1: When firms become more productive, bigger, or more experienced, their imports become significantly more upstream,
their exports become moderately more proximate to final demand, and they span more production stages (in China).
As noted earlier in Section 2.4, these empirical findings do not directly reveal whether the expansion along global production
lines occurred through firms performing more manufacturing stages themselves or through the sourcing of previously imported
inputs (i.e., previously offshored stages) from other domestic suppliers. This is because the ASIF data do not provide a detailed
product-level breakdown of the material inputs that the firm purchases, nor the source – whether domestic or foreign – of
these inputs. That said, these results do indicate that firms are taking responsibility for the supervision and completion of a
wider segment of the supply chain within China, regardless of how that is operationalized. Our later findings in Section 4.3 for
firms' value added, inputs and cost structure will also suggest that firms themselves are performing at least some of these addi-
tional production steps in-house.
4.2.1. OLS correlation
We begin with the role of firm productivity in Table 5. We find consistent patterns using several standard revenue-based mea-
sures of productivity in the literature, which we can readily construct from the ASIF.28 In Panel A, we consider log real value
added per worker, computed as the difference between output value and intermediate inputs, after deflating respectively by out-
put and input deflators specific to the firm's primary GB/T 4-digit industry. In Panels B\\D, we apply respectively the Olley-Pakes
(OP), Levinsohn-Petrin (LP), and Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer (ACF) methodologies to obtain TFPR residuals from a production func-
tion estimated separately for each GB/T 2-digit industry. We arrive at similar findings and conclusions if we were to allow for
more flexibility, by estimating separate production functions for firms under the three broad ownership categories (SOE, PVT,
JV/MNC) within each GB/T 2-digit industry.
We document in each Panel in Table 5 that within firms over time, higher productivity is associated with significantly more
upstream imports (a higher UftM, Column 1) and with a stable profile in the proximity of exports to final demand (no significant
change in UftX, Column 2). As a result, productivity improvements are accompanied by firms managing a wider span of stages
within China (an increase in UftM − UftX, Column 3). Moreover, the widening of the span of stages is not driven by where along
the production chain firms operate: We continue to obtain a positive and significant correlation between firm productivity and
Uft
M − UftX, with the coefficient estimate being largely unchanged, when we further condition on the GVC position of the firm's ex-
ports, UftX, in Column 4.
It is useful to translate the coefficients in Table 5 into implied magnitudes for the span of stages that firms undertake in China.
Bearing in mind the within-firm nature of the regression specification, we take the annualized change in each firm's productivity
over time (calculated based on the first and final years in which the firm was active in the ASIF-CCTS panel), and consider the
mean value of these within-firm changes as a benchmark shift in productivity. With this hypothetical shift, the implied change
in the span of stages, UftM − UftX, ranges from 0.001 (for log TFPR OP) to 0.003 (for log TFPR LP).29 This should be viewed against
the average annual within-firm change in UftM − UftX of 0.029 in the data. While it appears that within-firm productivity changes
only account for modest shifts in the span of production stages, note that we will obtain much larger effects when we turn to the
IV estimates in Section 4.2.2.
We examine in Table 6 the role of firm size and experience, which are firm attributes often closely linked to productivity. In
Panel A, we use log total nominal sales as a comprehensive measure of firm scale.30 As an alternative in Panel B, we consider log
employment as a quantity-based indicator of production scale. Across both measures of firm size, we consistently observe that as
firms grow bigger, they import inputs that are further upstream (Column 1), and shift exports towards products that are more
proximate to the end-user (Column 2). These patterns contribute to the span of production stages UftM − UftX widening significantly
with firm size, regardless of whether or not one conditions on where along the supply chain the firm is anchored as proxied by UftX
(Columns 3 and 4).3128 We focus on TFPR, as the ASIF does not include information on input and output prices at the level of individual firms to allow the construction of reliable quantity-
based measures of productivity (TFPQ). All price deflators that we have used in the data work are instead industry-level series.
29 As an example, the mean annual within-firm change in log TFPR LP in Panel C is 0.198, so the associated change in the span of stages is: 0.0138 × 0.198 ≈ 0.003.
30 As (7) includes industry-yearfixed effects, and output deflators are only available at the industry level,wewould obtain equivalent results if the dependent variable
were instead log real sales.




Firm productivity and global production line position.
Dep variable: UftM UftX UftM - UftX UftM - UftX UftM UftX UftM - UftX UftM - UftX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Productivity: Panel A: Log real VA per worker Panel B: Log TFPR Olley-Pakes
Productivity 0.0117*** 0.0003 0.0114*** 0.0117*** 0.0069** 0.0001 0.0067** 0.0069**
[0.0024] [0.0012] [0.0027] [0.0024] [0.0029] [0.0015] [0.0032] [0.0029]
UftX -0.9474*** -0.9557***
[0.0093] [0.0099]
Capital Intensity -0.0114*** 0.0023* -0.0138*** -0.0115*** -0.0088*** 0.0014 -0.0102*** -0.0089***
[0.0025] [0.0013] [0.0029] [0.0025] [0.0027] [0.0014] [0.0031] [0.0027]
Skill Intensity 0.0063** -0.0005 0.0068* 0.0063** 0.0092*** -0.0015 0.0107*** 0.0093***
[0.0032] [0.0016] [0.0036] [0.0032] [0.0034] [0.0017] [0.0038] [0.0034]
N 145,534 145,534 145,534 145,534 134,817 134,817 134,817 134,817
R2 0.7916 0.9604 0.8264 0.8550 0.7986 0.9629 0.8314 0.8586
Productivity: Panel C: Log TFPR Levinsohn-Petrin Panel D: Log TFPR Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer
Productivity 0.0135*** -0.0003 0.0138*** 0.0135*** 0.0090*** -0.0001 0.0091*** 0.0090***
[0.0026] [0.0013] [0.0029] [0.0026] [0.0025] [0.0013] [0.0028] [0.0025]
UftX -0.9571*** -0.9585***
[0.0100] [0.0099]
Capital Intensity -0.0066** 0.0012 -0.0078** -0.0067** -0.0088*** 0.0013 -0.0101*** -0.0088***
[0.0027] [0.0014] [0.0031] [0.0027] [0.0027] [0.0014] [0.0030] [0.0027]
Skill Intensity 0.0065* -0.0013 0.0078** 0.0066* 0.0068** -0.0008 0.0076** 0.0069**
[0.0034] [0.0017] [0.0038] [0.0034] [0.0034] [0.0017] [0.0038] [0.0034]
N 134,434 134,434 134,434 134,434 135,334 135,334 135,334 135,334
R2 0.7978 0.9632 0.8312 0.8584 0.7977 0.9632 0.8315 0.8589
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The sample comprises the matched CCTS-ASIF 2000–2006 panel of non-intermediary firms, in all years in which the firm both imports and exports. Each
panel reports a separate set of regressions using the firm productivity measure indicated in the panel heading; for each productivity measure, observations with
productivity smaller than the 1st percentile or larger than the 99th percentile are dropped. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All columns include firm and industry-by-year fixed effects.
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ment as reported in the ASIF; to accommodate entrants during our sample period, we work with log(age + 1). In Panel D, we
focus on experience specifically with production for and sales to foreign markets. For a firm that is active in year t, we capture
this by the log of its cumulative past exports up to year t − 1 as recorded in the CCTS. As there is potential censoring of this var-
iable for firms that began exporting prior to 2000, we include an interaction term between log cumulative past exports as de-
scribed and an indicator variable for whether the firm was an active exporter in 2000.32 The regression results indicate that as
companies mature and become more experienced participants in global trade, they tend to expand the number of production
stages they conduct by importing more upstream inputs, while shifting slightly the positioning of their exports closer to final
demand (Columns 1–3); this finding does not depend on whether or not we control for the positioning of a firm's exports
(Column 4).
The effects of firm size and experience that can be inferred from Table 6 are fairly sizeable, when benchmarked using the
mean annual within-firm change for each firm attribute (as in the earlier calculations with the productivity measures). To give
two examples, the mean annual within-firm shift in log sales among Chinese firms can explain an increase of 0.006 in the
span of stages performed, while the corresponding effect of export experience (log cumulative past exports) is an even larger
expansion of 0.025 in UftM − UftX.33
We have performed several checks to verify the robustness of these relationships of firms' production staging to firms' produc-
tivity, size and experience. First, as mentioned earlier, all findings hold when omitting the controls for firms' capital and skill in-
tensity. The baseline specifications with these controls should be interpreted with a grain of salt to the extent that productivity,
size and experience are primitives that determine firm operations including skill and capital use. The estimates in Tables 5-6 nev-
ertheless suggest that expansion into more production stages is associated with lower capital intensity and higher skill intensity.
Separately, we have confirmed that the results are not driven by differences across firms in their participation in processing versus32 The results are very similar if we instead use firms' cumulative past imports – constructed and allowing for censoring in the regression in an analogousmanner – to
capture experience with foreign suppliers.
33 Themean annual within-firm change in log sales in our sample is 0.167; based on the Panel A, Column 3 coefficient estimate, this translates into an increase in the
span of stages of 0.0335 × 0.167≈ 0.006. For cumulative exports, we focus on the coefficient of the main effect term, as the interaction with the dummy for whether
cumulative exports might be censored is not statistically significant. The mean annual within-firm change in log past exports is 1.082, implying a shift in the span of
stages of 0.0235 × 1.082 ≈ 0.025.
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Firm size, experience and global production line position.
Dep variable: UftM UftX UftM - UftX UftM - UftX UftM UftX UftM - UftX UftM - UftX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Size: Panel A: Log Sales Panel B: Log Employment
Size 0.0293*** -0.0042** 0.0335*** 0.0295*** 0.0260*** -0.0038 0.0298*** 0.0262***
[0.0033] [0.0017] [0.0036] [0.0033] [0.0044] [0.0024] [0.0049] [0.0044]
UftX -0.9524*** -0.9536***
[0.0090] [0.0090]
Capital Intensity -0.0094*** 0.0016 -0.0109*** -0.0094*** -0.0039 0.0015 -0.0054* -0.0040
[0.0024] [0.0012] [0.0027] [0.0024] [0.0026] [0.0014] [0.0029] [0.0026]
Skill Intensity 0.0069** 0.0001 0.0068** 0.0069** 0.0132*** -0.0001 0.0133*** 0.0132***
[0.0030] [0.0015] [0.0033] [0.0030] [0.0031] [0.0016] [0.0034] [0.0031]
N 152,917 152,917 152,917 152,917 153,426 153,426 153,426 153,426
R2 0.7889 0.9596 0.8242 0.8534 0.7888 0.9596 0.8235 0.8529
Experience: Panel C: Log (Age+1) Panel D: Log Cumulative Past Exports
Experience 0.1802*** -0.0082 0.1884*** 0.1806*** 0.0207*** -0.0028** 0.0235*** 0.0209***
[0.0126] [0.0061] [0.0140] [0.0126] [0.0030] [0.0014] [0.0033] [0.0030]
Experience× Censored -0.0044 -0.0046* 0.0003 -0.0041
[0.0047] [0.0024] [0.0051] [0.0046]
UftX -0.9531*** -0.9425***
[0.0088] [0.0114]
Capital Intensity -0.0125*** 0.0018 -0.0142*** -0.0125*** -0.0097*** 0.0026* -0.0123*** -0.0099***
[0.0024] [0.0012] [0.0027] [0.0024] [0.0029] [0.0014] [0.0032] [0.0029]
Skill Intensity 0.0062** 0.0001 0.0061* 0.0062** 0.0037 0.0008 0.0028 0.0036
[0.0029] [0.0015] [0.0033] [0.0029] [0.0036] [0.0017] [0.0039] [0.0036]
N 156,358 156,358 156,358 156,358 109,803 109,803 109,803 109,803
R2 0.7897 0.9592 0.8235 0.8532 0.8089 0.9692 0.8443 0.8667
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The sample comprises the matched CCTS-ASIF 2000–2006 panel of non-intermediary firms, in all years in which the firm both imports and exports. Each
panel reports a separate set of regressions using the firm size or experience measure indicated in the panel heading; for each panel, observations where the size/
experience measure is smaller than the 1st percentile or larger than the 99th percentile are dropped. In Panel D, the “Censored” indicator variable is equal to 1 if
the firm reports positive exports in 2000, so that its cumulative exports are potentially left-censored due to the lack of firm-level export data pre-2000. Standard
errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All columns include firm and industry-by-year fixed effects.
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cessing trade regime.34 Third, our results continue to hold for different constructions of the firm-level upstreamness measures,
such as when we retain only products that map to manufacturing industries, or when we drop minerals (HS codes 25–27).
We have further explored whether the relationship between productivity and the upstreamness of a firm's trade flows might
exhibit heterogeneity across firm ownership types. Appendix Table 5 presents results from estimating (7) with firm productivity
Zft interacted with a set of dummies for the firm's ownership status (respectively, SOE, PVT, or JVC/MNC).35 Interestingly, the pos-
itive correlation between firm productivity and the span of stages is strongest for joint ventures and multinational affiliates across
all revenue-based productivity measures; while the effect is generally positive for private domestic firms, these coefficients tend
to be less precisely estimated. A potential explanation could be that firms with significant foreign ownership shares are less finan-
cially constrained than firms under different ownership structures (c.f., Manova et al., 2015), and can therefore more readily ex-
pand their span of stages in response to productivity improvements.3634 Alternatively, the export processing share can itself be interpreted as a proxy for a firm's experiencewith international trade, as the processing trade regime is often
viewed as a platform throughwhichChinesefirms started engaging inGVCs. Appendix Table 4, Panel B, reports regressionswherewe adopt this perspective and use the
export processing share as the firm attribute Zft in specification (7). We find that firms that conduct a greater share of processing trade import products (presumably
inputs) that are more upstream, export products closer to final demand, and thus span a greater set of production stages in China. This could be because producing on
behalf of a foreign buyer engenders knowledge transfer that enables Chinese firms to undertake more manufacturing steps.
35 Note that these three ownership types fully span all firms in our sample, so that themain effects of the ownership dummies are subsumed by the firm fixed effects.
36 We have further examinedwhether the patternswe have documentedmight also be present in cross-sectional variation. To do so, we replace the firm fixed effects
in (7) with a full set of GB/T 4-digit industry by city by ownership-type dummies, while retaining the industry-by-year fixed effects, φst. Appendix Table 6 reports the
results from this exercise. We do not obtain as consistent a pattern of correlations across all four TFP measures, possibly because these regressions do not control as
thoroughly for potential firm-level variables that could be affecting both firm productivity and its production staging decisions. For log real value added per worker
and TFP ACF (Panels A and D), higher firm productivity is positively correlated with both the upstreamness of imports and exports; we do find that higher productivity
is associatedwith awider span of stages, but only if we condition on UftX (Column 4), suggesting that the proximity of the firm's exports to final demand is a key omitted
variable. On the other hand, the effect of productivity on UftM − UftX is not precisely estimated for TFPR OP and TFPR LP (Panels B and C).
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The results from OLS specification (7) reveal informative systematic correlations between key attributes of Chinese firms and
their production line position. We now provide complementary evidence based on two-stage-least-squares estimation, which in-
dicates that changes in productivity can have causal effects on firms' production staging.
Our IV strategy seeks to exploit plausibly exogenous positive shocks to foreign demand, which can in turn raise firms' exports
and thereby total sales. Such shocks can further boost firm TFP if they trigger changes in firms' production processes that generate
increasing returns. In the context of China's exporters, it has been argued that positive shocks to export demand can facilitate
learning-by-exporting about consumer preferences in foreign markets and about know-how at the technological and quality fron-
tiers (e.g., Park et al., 2010). Along similar lines, increases in export revenue can make feasible investments to upgrade a firm's
production technology or reorganize its internal processes (e.g., Brandt et al., 2014). A positive shock to foreign demand can
thus raise revenue-based measures of firm productivity, such as those we have computed for the ASIF-CCTS panel.
We construct our ExportIVft instrument by first computing a shift-share projected growth rate in foreign demand for firm f’s
products from year t − 1 to t, to capture movements at the firm-year level. This is done by taking a weighted-average of the
year-on-year growth in rest-of-the-world export flows; in particular, we draw on the CEPII BACI dataset for its information on
total exports emanating from the rest of the world (i.e., excluding China), XROW,cpt, disaggregated by destination country c and
HS 6-digit product p. To capture the degree of exposure of each firm f on the exporting front to these country-by-product
trade shocks, we use as weights the share of country c and product p in firm f ’s export profile, Xfcp,0Xf ,0 , in the first year (indexed
by 0) where we observe firm f exporting in the CCTS data. Combining this projected growth rate with information on the one-
year lagged level of f’s exports, we obtain a predicted (log) level of firm f’s exports in year t, which will serve as our IV. The pre-
cise formula for the foreign demand instrument is given by:37 The
its 10th














A; ð9Þwhere we exclude China as a destination country c in the weighted average in (9).37 Note that for each firm f, we construct
ExportIVft for years in which t − 1 > 0, so that the predicted country-by-product export growth rates in (9) do not use data
from years that overlap with the initial year 0 for which export share weights are available for the firm in question. Given that
our ASIF-CCTS panel starts in 2000, this means that we have been conservative in constructing ExportIVft only for 2002–2006.
The above constitutes a valid instrument if the shifts in foreign demand captured by the rest-of-the-world trade shocks are exog-
enous from the perspective of individual Chinese firms f, and insofar as the consequent effects on firms' production staging deci-
sions are mediated through their effect on firm productivity.
Table 7 presents our estimates from re-running (7) with ExportIVft as an instrumental variable for each of the measures of firm
productivity. These reproduce the pattern of correlations seen earlier in Table 5, and indicate that there is a causal dimension in
the effects of shocks to firm productivity on Chinese firms' GVC positioning. The first stage in Column 1 confirms that ExportIVft
has strong predictive power: the IV has an expected positive and significant effect on firm productivity, and the F-statistics are
moreover large with the exception of log TFPR OP (Panel B). The results for the second stage in Columns 2–5 corroborate the ear-
lier OLS analysis. The point estimates we obtain are moreover considerably larger in all panels, yielding statistically significant re-
sults (except for log TFPR OP). This is consistent both with measurement error in firm productivity and with larger responses to
exogenous shocks to productivity compared to changes that are endogenously initiated by the firm. Consequently, the implied
magnitudes of these effects on the span of stages is much bigger: For example, for the mean within-firm annual change in log
TFPR LP quoted in Section 4.2.1, the implied increase in UftM − UftX is now 0.039, larger than the actual within-firm annual change
of 0.029 seen in the data.38
In Appendix Table 7, we present results for the impact of firm size when using the predicted foreign demand variable as an IV
for log sales or log employment. These confirm that a rise in foreign demand has a direct positive effect on the scale of firm pro-
duction that should in principle precede observed changes in productivity. In line with this logic, we do find in the respective
first-stage regressions that the estimated effects of ExportIVft on log sales and log employment are larger, when compared against
the corresponding effects on any of the four TFP measures in Table 7.
Much like exogenous shocks to foreign demand, exogenous shocks to foreign supply can also move firm productivity and size.
A rise in foreign productivity or product quality may induce Chinese firms to source more foreign inputs, lower their marginal
production costs, and thereby increase their TFP. This can occur directly through improved access to superior or cheaper equip-
ment, or indirectly through complementarities between production inputs and production technologies or management practices
(e.g., Amiti and Konings, 2007; Kasahara and Rodrigue, 2008; Goldberg et al., 2010; Halpern et al., 2015). Appendix Table 8
presents IV regressions where we use an ImportIVft instrument that is the analogue of (9) for Chinese firms' imports, based on
how shocks experienced in rest-of-the-world imports (disaggregated by origin country and HS6 product) potentially impactcountry-by-HS6-product export growth rates exhibit both large positive andnegativeextremevalues, and sowewinsorize (XROW,cpt−XROW,cp,t−1)/XROW,cp,t−1 at
and 90th percentiles when calculating ExportIVft.
cifically, using the Column 4 point estimate in Panel C of Table 7, and following steps similar to footnote 29 in Section 4.2.1, we have: 0.1966 × 0.198≈ 0.039.
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Table 7
Firm productivity, IV evidence.
Dep variable: 1st Stage UftM UftX UftM - UftX UftM - UftX 1st Stage UftM UftX UftM - UftX UftM - UftX
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Productivity: Panel A: Log real VA per worker Panel B: Log TFPR Olley-Pakes
Export IV 0.0127*** 0.0050*
[0.0034] [0.0029]
Productivity 0.6406** -0.0769 0.7174** 0.6449** 1.7099 -0.1403 1.8502 1.7145
[0.2635] [0.1336] [0.3036] [0.2639] [1.1400] [0.3477] [1.2669] [1.1401]
UftX -0.9441*** -0.9672***
[0.0176] [0.0344]
N 80,693 80,693 80,693 80,693 80,693 77,681 77,681 77,681 77,681 77,681
R2 0.8679 0.7055 0.9737 0.7554 0.7947 0.7336 0.1324 0.9721 0.2925 0.3922
F-stat 14.19 14.19 14.19 14.21 2.908 2.908 2.908 2.923
Productivity: Panel C: Log TFPR Levinsohn-Petrin Panel D: Log TFPR Ackerberg-Caves-Frazer
Export IV 0.0481*** 0.0141***
[0.0036] [0.0035]
Productivity 0.1743*** -0.0223 0.1966*** 0.1756*** 0.6564*** -0.0782 0.7345** 0.6605***
[0.0574] [0.0351] [0.0672] [0.0574] [0.2487] [0.1192] [0.2864] [0.2492]
UftX -0.9431*** -0.9478***
[0.0150] [0.0184]
N 77,144 77,144 77,144 77,144 77,144 78,018 78,018 78,018 78,018 78,018
R2 0.9013 0.8231 0.9762 0.8578 0.8769 0.8783 0.6977 0.9748 0.7498 0.7899
F-stat 175.0 175.0 175.0 175.0 16.34 16.34 16.34 16.36
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
K and H intensity Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The sample comprises the matched CCTS-ASIF 2000–2006 panel of non-intermediary firms, in all years in which the firm both imports and exports. Each
panel reports a separate set of regressions using the firm productivity measure indicated in the panel heading; for each productivity measure, observations with
productivity smaller than the 1st percentile or larger than the 99th percentile are dropped. The IV is a firm-level predicted log export variable for year t, con-
structed from: (i) observed rest-of-the-world export shocks (less exports from China) broken down by destination country and product between year t-1 and
t; (ii) each firm's country-product export shares in the first year in which they record exports; and (iii) lag firm-level exports in year t-1. Standard errors are clus-
tered by firm. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All columns include firm and industry-by-year fixed effects.
D. Chor, K. Manova and Z. Yu Journal of International Economics 130 (2021) 103445the firm f given its initial import profile. The results this yields are very much consistent with what we have seen in Table 7 from
using ExportIVft.394.3. Firm value added, costs, assets, and profits
We next establish that changes in firms' global production line position are accompanied by shifts in their value added, input
usage, cost and asset structure, as well as profits. Here, we work off specification (8) using different indicators for firm operations,
Yft, as the left-hand side variable.
Firm Fact 2: When firms span more production stages (in China), they increase value added in production, total input purchases,
and total wagebill proportionately with sales.
In the first two columns of Table 8, we examine the relationship between firms' span of stages and the amount of value they
add in production. Column 1 demonstrates that value added rises sharply as the distance between the position of firms' imports
and exports in GVCs widens, with a one-stage increase in UftM − UftX associated with real value added that is on average 3.1%
higher. This relationship may appear at first glance to be mechanical: When a firm spans more stages, one might naturally expect
it to be responsible for a greater amount of value added in the production process. Column 2 shows that this partial correlation is
instead explained by an associated scaling up of firm operations. We condition here on log real firm sales to capture the firm's
gross output. Value added indeed moves in step with total sales, with a point estimate close to 1. Moreover, this proportional39 More specifically, ImportIVft is computed as:







,whereMROW,cpt is the value of total imports of HS6-digit product p by the rest of the world (excluding
China) from country c in year t; Mfcp,0M f ,0 is the share of country c and product p infirm f’s imports, in the initial year 0 thefirm records imports in the CCTS; andMf,t−1 is firm
f’s total imports in year t − 1. (MROW,cpt − MROW,cp,t−1)/MROW,cp,t−1 is winsorized at its 10th and 90th percentiles. Although it is possible to use both ExportIVft and
ImportIVft simultaneously as instruments, we do not report these results as they tend not to pass the over-identification test.
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Table 8
Firm global production line position, inputs and value added.
Dep variable: Log Real Value Added Log Real Total Inputs Log Wagebill Imports / Total Inputs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
UftM - UftX 0.0309*** 0.0009 0.0288*** -0.0013 0.0307*** 0.0049 -7.1574*** -6.3846***
[0.0045] [0.0030] [0.0036] [0.0016] [0.0051] [0.0043] [0.3179] [0.3109]
Log Real Sales 0.9619*** 0.9229*** 0.7141*** -21.4526***
[0.0040] [0.0030] [0.0072] [0.6373]
N 145,216 144,131 150,286 149,266 153,286 148,591 153,006 147,326
R2 0.8769 0.9357 0.9104 0.9760 0.9393 0.9541 0.7436 0.7589
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
K & H Intensity Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The sample comprises thematched CCTS-ASIF 2000–2006 panel of non-intermediary firms, in all years inwhich the firm both imports and exports. Each pair of
columns reports a separate set of regressions using a different measure of firm inputs and value added, as indicated in the column heading; for each firm input/value
added measure, observations smaller than the 1st percentile or larger than the 99th percentile are dropped. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. All columns include firm and industry-by-year fixed effects. The firm-levelmeasures of capital and skill intensity.
D. Chor, K. Manova and Z. Yu Journal of International Economics 130 (2021) 103445adjustment fully explains the unconditional correlation between value added and UftM − UftX, as the coefficient on the latter is now
statistically indistinguishable from 0.40
We next consider the pattern of firms' variable input use. We find that firms significantly increase their total input purchases
when they broaden the scope of manufacturing steps they undertake in China. Overall, a widening in UftM − UftX by one production
stage is associated within firms with real input purchases that are 2.9% higher (Column 3). We obtain the same pattern when
looking at labor inputs, as captured by firms' total wagebill (computed from the ASIF as the average wage times total employ-
ment). There, a unit increase in a firm's span of stages corresponds to a total outlay on wages that is 3.1% greater (Column 5).
As with value added, these increases in variable costs entirely reflect an expansion in the scale of firms' output, as the partial cor-
relations are not statistically significant once we condition on log real sales (Columns 4 and 6).
Interestingly, we find in Column 7 that the span of a firm's operations in global production lines, UftM − UftX, is negatively cor-
related with the ratio of its imports relative to its total intermediate input purchases. This pattern persists when controlling for
the firm's log sales (Column 8), indicating that it is not merely an artefact of an expansion in the overall scale of firm operations.
Put otherwise, as the scope of stages undertaken in China has widened, there appears to have been some switching within firms
towards procuring a greater share of inputs from domestic sources, though we caution that we cannot say anything more defin-
itive since we do not directly observe the domestic production network or the composition of firms' domestic inputs. In Appendix
Table 9 (Columns 1–2), we report an analogous pattern on the exporting side: the span of stages conducted within China corre-
lates positively with a firm's export intensity, as proxied by its export-to-sales ratio. Taken together, these hint at some subtle
shifts in the manner of Chinese firms' engagement in GVCs that warrant closer study in future work.
Firm Fact 3: When firms span more production stages (in China), they increase their fixed costs and assets. They also earn higher
profits that rise proportionately with sales.
In Table 9, we consider respectively the log level of net fixed plant, property and equipment (Columns 1–2) and its share in
total book-value assets (Columns 3–4). These measures reflect respectively how important the stock of long-term capital is to firm
operations in an absolute and in a relative sense. In the remainder of the table, we instead study the log value of inventories (Col-
umns 5–6) and their value relative to total assets (Columns 7–8). Outstanding inventories constitute a flow of short-term fixed
costs of manufacturing and maintaining supply capacity.
We observe that when firms manage more production stages (in China), they maintain more fixed assets and incur higher
fixed costs: The value of fixed assets and inventories, as well as each of their shares in total firm assets, all rise with the span
of production stages. As an illustration of the implied magnitudes, based on the point estimates in Columns 1 and 5, a one-
stage widening in UftM − UftX is associated respectively with 1.5% higher investment in fixed assets and 2.4% more inventory hold-
ings.41 Together, the patterns in Tables 8-9 are consistent with firms incurring higher fixed and variable costs when they under-
take more manufacturing stages within China.
We explore last how a firm's global production line position relates to its performance in terms of profits. We estimate spec-
ification (8) using a measure, Πft, of firm-level profits, computed as total real profits from operations after applying industry-spe-
cific output deflators. The summary statistics in Table 1 indicate that this profit variable exhibits a particularly large dispersion;40 These findings in Column 2 are unchanged even if wewere to further control for UftX to capture the proximity to final demand of the products the firm exports. This
statement on robustness applies to each of the subsequent firm attributes considered as left-hand side variables in Tables 8-9 and Appendix Table 9 (available on
request).
41 As log inventories remain significantly correlatedwithUftM−UftX even after controlling for log sales (Column 6, Table 9), onemight atfirst glance draw the conclusion
that thismeasure of fixed costs risesmore than sales as thefirmengages in awider span of stages. Note though that the estimated coefficient of log real sales (0.3838) in
this regression is much below 1.Whenwe re-run this regression with the log inventories-to-sales ratio as the dependent variable (i.e., moving log real sales to the left-




Firm global production line position, assets and cost structure, and profits.





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
UftM - UftX 0.0145*** 0.0025 0.0036*** 0.0037*** 0.0244*** 0.0111** 0.0033*** 0.0033*** 101.88*** 21.42
[0.0026] [0.0022] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0049] [0.0048] [0.0006] [0.0006] [29.88] [28.08]
Log Real Sales 0.3573*** -0.0076*** 0.3838*** -0.0009 2,882.86***
[0.0037] [0.0009] [0.0072] [0.0009] [39.37]
N 153,323 148,516 153,951 148,110 148,932 144,640 154,483 148,581 133,167 131,802
R2 0.9721 0.9790 0.8549 0.8570 0.8742 0.8811 0.7154 0.7183 0.7262 0.7553
Industry-Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Firm FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
K & H Intensity Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Notes: The sample comprises thematched CCTS-ASIF 2000–2006 panel of non-intermediary firms, in all years inwhich the firm both imports and exports. Each pair of
columns reports a separate set of regressions using a differentmeasure offirmassets, inventories, or profits, as indicated in thepanel heading. For each firmasset/inven-
torymeasure, observations smaller than the1st percentile or larger than the99thpercentile are dropped. For the real profitmeasure, given its greater skew, observations
smaller than the 5th percentile and larger than the 95th percentile are dropped. Standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and
10% levels respectively. All columns include firm and industry-by-year fixed effects. The firm-level measures of capital and skill intensity.
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reported profits. We therefore trim the top and bottom 5% of observations from our sample. The regressions confirm that firms
earn systematically higher profits when they complete more production stages in GVCs (Column 9). At the same time, these
profits appear to rise as a consequence of the scaling up of firms' overall operations, as the partial correlation vanishes once
we control for log firm sales (Column 10). Consistent with this last result, we report in Appendix Table 9 that UftM − UftX does
not correlate significantly with various measures of firm profitability, including the profit-to-sales ratio, the profit-to-value-
added ratio, and return on assets (defined as profits relative to total assets).42
5. Towards a conceptual framework
The empirical analysis has uncovered new stylized facts about the joint evolution of Chinese firms' attributes and their produc-
tion line position over the firm lifecycle. We propose here a conceptual framework that can rationalize these facts and give them
an internally consistent economic interpretation. We consider a stylized, partial-equilibrium setting, in which the firm takes cer-
tain market conditions as given, such as the price of intermediate goods at different stages of completion. Our purpose is to high-
light in as basic a framework as possible some key trade-offs for understanding a firm's span of production stages, that more
complete models – incorporating considerations related for example to market power – can build on in future work.
5.1. Set-up
The production of final goods in any given industry requires the completion of a continuum of stages. These stages are
uniquely sequenced due to technological reasons; for example, the tyres of a car need to be ready before the rolling chassis
can be assembled. We index the production stages by u ∈ [1, ∞ ), where a higher u refers to a stage that is more upstream
and positioned earlier in the production sequence. In particular, the most upstream stage at the start of the production line is
indexed by u = ∞, while the completed final good is indexed by u = 1. We adopt this convention to be consistent with the em-
pirical measure of upstreamness in the prior sections.
We consider the decision problem of a firm that is active in one particular industry, over the measure of production stages to







x uð Þαduþ qαM
 !ρ
α
, ð10Þwhere 1 ≤ UX < UM and α, ρ ∈ (0,1). Here, qM is the quantity of the semi-finished good that has been completed up to stage UM,
which the firm purchases as an intermediate input; to be clear, all stage inputs for u ∈ [UM, ∞ ) have already been built into this
intermediate input when it is purchased. The production stages from u = UM to u = UX are then performed, with the firm choos-
ing the quantity x(u) of inputs for each of these stages.43 The output q that the firm generates is in turn a semi-finished good that
has been completed up to stage UX.these latter variables, we first drop the tail 5% of observations for total real profits; we then compute the respective ratios and further drop the tail 1% of obser-
for each profit margin measure thereafter.
have emphasized the sequentiality of the production stages to be in keeping with prior modeling work on production chains such as Harms et al. (2012),
t et al. (2013), and Antràs and Chor (2013). One can, however, interpret the production function in (10) as one in which all stages u ∈ [UX,UM] are performed
neously by the firm, such that the insights we derive do not depend crucially on the timing of these production stages.
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context of China for us to associate UM and UX with the firm-level import and export upstreamness measures constructed earlier.
As in the earlier empirical work, we do not specify whether the firm performs stages u ∈ [UX,UM] in-house or fulfills them via
arm's length purchases from domestic suppliers. As currently formulated, the implicit assumption is that the costs associated
with in-house production of a given stage u are not too dissimilar from that which would be incurred when outsourcing to a do-
mestic supplier. A richer model that takes this domestic sourcing decision more explicitly into account would be a meaningful di-
rection for future work, especially if its predictions could be explored with more detailed data.
In (10), the intermediate input qM and the stage inputs x(u) are combined in a CES manner, with elasticity of substitution
equal to 1/(1 − α) > 1.44 The parameter ρ ∈ (0,1) captures the degree to which the output of the firm is subject to decreasing
returns to scale. Given the price-taking assumptions that we adopt below, ρ needs to be strictly smaller than 1 in order for the
size of the firm to be uniquely pinned down.
The productivity of the firm is given by θ. To fix ideas, one can think of θ as coming from a productivity draw that the firm
receives upon its successful entry into the industry (Melitz, 2003), which reflects the efficiency of its assembly technologies
and/or the effectiveness of its management practices. For our purposes, we will treat θ as a firm-specific attribute and consider
comparative statics with respect to it, to explore how the span of stages the firm performs would respond to exogenous shocks
to its productivity. A richer dynamic framework would model the evolution of this productivity over the firm lifecycle, and how
this might affect firm entry and exit decisions; these are pertinent issues that we abstract from here. Note that θ can be
interpreted alternatively as a quality term, with changes in θ reflecting shocks to market demand for the firm's output.
We assume for simplicity that the firm is small within the industry and that it takes prices as given. There is moreover an
open competitive market for semi-finished goods at all stages of completion u ∈ [1, ∞ ) with price schedule p(u). We posit
that p′(u) < 0: the market price of a more upstream good is lower, as these embody fewer completed production stages. As
an example, this means that there is a market price for the raw rubber needed to manufacture four tyres, and that this is
lower than the purchase price for a set of completed tyres.45
The firm incurs two costs for each production stage u ∈ [UX, UM] that it performs: (i) a variable cost, c(u), per unit of the stage
input x(u); and (ii) a per period fixed cost, f(u), which applies as long as x(u) > 0. One can view c(u) as the cost of labor inputs
that are required to produce each unit of the stage input x(u). In turn, the f(u) can be interpreted as an overhead usage cost of
assets and equipment necessary for the execution of the production stage u. For convenience, we will assume that both c(u)
and f(u) are differentiable functions.46











c uð Þx uð Þdu−
Z UM
UX
f uð Þdu, ð11Þthis being the revenue from sales of the stage-UX good, less the cost of qM units of the stage-UM intermediate input, as well as
the variable and fixed costs for the stages u ∈ [UX, UM]. Given knowledge of its productivity θ, the firm then chooses: (i) the cut-off
stages, UM and UX; (ii) the quantity qM of the upstream intermediate input to purchase; and (iii) the quantity of {x(u)}u=UXu=U
M
for each
stage input. These decisions are made to maximize the firm's profits as specified in (11). We will focus for simplicity on a situation
where the firm's profit maximization problem yields an interior solution that yields positive profits.
5.2. Firm behavior
We explore how an increase in a firm's productivity can impact the optimal span of stages that it engages in. A shock to θ
would lead a profit-maximizing firm to re-evaluate the positions of its cut-off stages UX and UM, while accordingly adjusting
the quantity qM of the upstream intermediate to procure and the quantities x(u) of stage inputs. We focus on the conditions
under which these firm-level responses would be consistent with the empirical patterns documented in Sections 3 and 4 for
the global production line position of Chinese firms.
Holding all else constant, a positive shock to productivity θ would raise the firm's output and hence its revenues. In principle,
this would make it feasible for the firm to conduct a larger range of production stages, by purchasing a more upstream interme-
diate input (i.e., increasing UM), and/or by assembling a product that is closer to the final good (i.e., decreasing UX). Intuitively, an
increase in UM would lower the price p(UM) of the more upstream intermediate input that must be purchased (since p′(u) < 0),
but this needs to be compared against the fixed and variable costs incurred when the firm takes on responsibility for the
inframarginal stages. Similarly, a decrease in UX means that the firm would be able to fetch a higher price p(UX) for selling a
more finished good, but this needs to be weighed against the additional fixed and variable costs of completing more stages.
The framework in Section 5.1 sheds light on these key trade-offs. The model set-up is fairly general and can accommodate dif-
ferent shifts in a firm's production span in response to shocks to its productivity. As should be clear though, what is important isCES formulation of the production function over stage inputs is similar to that in Antràs and Chor (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2019).
ractice, some inputsmight need to be customized to the specific needs of thefirm. Antràs andChor (2013) and Alfaro et al. (2019) study the implications of such
ity for production chains under incomplete contracts, where firm payoffs are pinned down by a bargaining process rather than market prices.
formulation of production costs here is flexible enough for c(u) to differ across firms, which allows firms to exhibit comparative advantage in performing par-
tages of production.
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we establish in the Theory Appendix, the following condition is sufficient to guarantee that a rise in firm productivity lead to a
widening of the span of production stages performed:
Sufficient Condition: (i) ρ > α; and (ii) f U
Mð Þ
p UMð ÞqM ,
c UMð Þx UMð Þ
p UMð ÞqM ,
f UXð Þ
p UXð Þq,
c UXð Þx UXð Þ
p UXð Þq are sufficiently small.
We demonstrate in the Theory Appendix that the first-order conditions associated with the firm's profit maximization problem
imply the following:
Proposition 1. Under the Sufficient Condition, a positive productivity shock will induce a firm to:
1. expand its span of production stages (
d UM−UXð Þ
dθ >0) by purchasing a more upstream input (
dUM
dθ >0) and selling output that is
more proximate to final demand (dU
X
dθ <0); and
2. use a higher quantity of the upstream input (dqMdθ >0) and of all stage inputs (
dx uð Þ
dθ >0 ∀u ∈ [U
X, UM]).
The Sufficient Condition lends itself to an intuitive interpretation. For Proposition 1 to hold, we require first that the firm's pro-
duction function not be subject too strongly to decreasing returns to scale (condition (i)). This provides a baseline technological
reason for a firm that has become more productive to raise its output, which it can achieve in part by expanding the span of
stages it performs. Put otherwise, this implies complementarity between the scale of the firm and the scope of production stages
it performs. In turn, condition (ii) describes a set of circumstances under which a more productive firm would find it optimal to
purchase a more upstream intermediate input, while selling output that is more proximate to final demand. This will be the case
so long as the firm has low fixed and variable costs in the neighborhood of its initial upstream cut-off stage UM, relative to the
costs incurred from purchasing the stage-UM good as an intermediate input; this ensures that the firm would find it feasible to
substitute towards performing more of these stages. Proposition 1 likewise requires that the fixed and variable costs associated
with the UX cut-off stage be sufficiently low, relative to the revenues received from selling a stage-UX good, in order to make it
profitable to take on more stages at this margin.
Relationship to Stylized Facts: It is useful to connect Proposition 1 with the empirical findings reported earlier. First, the pre-
dictions for how UX, UM and hence UM − UX each respond to exogenous increases in firm productivity line up with Firm Fact 1. To
the extent that more productive firms also exhibit a larger volume of total sales and are more likely to survive over time, the
proposition can further rationalize the empirical patterns for firm size and experience and their strong correlation with the
firm-level upstreamness measures.47 In the proof in the Appendix, we further highlight that if we were to relax the requirement
that fixed and variable costs,
f UXð Þ
p UXð Þq and
c UXð Þx UXð Þ
p UXð Þq , in the neighborhood of the U
X cut-off stage be sufficiently small, this can mute
(or even reverse) the predicted sign of dU
X
dθ , even while retaining the prediction that
dUM
dθ >0. This would be consistent with the pat-
tern of results uncovered in Section 4.2.1, where the correlation between firm productivity and export upstreamness was rela-
tively weak, whereas the positive correlation with import upstreamness (and hence the span of stages) was especially robust.
Second, Proposition 1 also provides a plausible explanation for the evolution of the overall import and export upstreamness of
China's trade flows (Macro Trends 1–3). Evidence in the prior literature points to a secular trend in productivity growth among
Chinese firms during our sample period (e.g., Brandt et al., 2012), which can generate the pattern of a rising UM and a falling
UX in the aggregate.48
We derive several additional results from the firm's profit maximization problem. With an increase in firm productivity θ,
profits π in (11) would rise even if UX, UM, qM and the x(u)’s were held fixed at their original values. It follows that profits nec-
essarily rise after taking into account any profit-maximizing adjustments that the firm might make to these key choice variables.
The solution to the firm's problem also pins down its inputs, costs, and value added. Under the Sufficient Condition, following
an increase in θ, the firm's total fixed costs, FC ≡ ∫UXU
M
f(u)du, would rise, given that UM increases and UX decreases. Since dx uð Þdθ >0,
the firm's total variable costs, VC ≡ ∫UXU
M
c(u)x(u)du, would also increase. Turning next to the firm's value added, defined as total
revenues less intermediate input purchases, VA ≡ p(UX)q − p(UM)qM, notice that VA is equal to the sum of the firm's profits, total
fixed costs, and total variable costs. Since these last three terms all increase with θ, value added also rises.
Lastly, the effect on the total outlay on intermediates, p(UM)qM, is more subtle: With a higher UM, the market price of the in-
termediate input is lower since p'(u) < 0, but this also induces the firm to demand a higher quantity qM of it. The Appendix shows
that under the Sufficient Condition, the latter force dominates and the firm's total input expenditure grows.
We summarize these conclusions as:
Proposition 2. Under the Sufficient Condition, a firm that expands its span of production stages, UM − UX, after a positive produc-
tivity shock will also experience: 1. higher profits, π; 2. higher value added, VA; 3. higher total variable costs, VC; 4. higher total
fixed costs, FC; and 5. higher intermediate input purchases, p(UM)qM.47 Appendix Table 1 confirms that in our Chinesefirm-level data, log productivity and log sales are indeed positively correlated,with the correlation coefficient varying
between 0.25 and 0.79, depending on the productivity measure.
48 This steady increase in TFP over time is readily corroborated by the firm-level measures of productivity that we have constructed and used to establish our Firm
Facts.
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firm's profit maximization problem. This is in contrast to Proposition 1, which speaks directly to a causal relationship running
from an increase in firm productivity to its production line position.
The first result in Proposition 2 – that profits rise when firms choose to span a wider segment of the production chain – is
consistent with Firm Fact 3.49 In turn, the shifts predicted in Proposition 2 are in line with the idea that expanding into more
stages is associated with incurring more fixed costs (Firm Fact 3), expanding the use of variable inputs such as intermediates
and labor (Firm Fact 2), and adding more value in production (Firm Fact 2). While we do not observe this directly in the data,
Firm Facts 2–3 together do suggest that when Chinese firms expand their span of stages, some of these additional production
steps are performed in-house: If they were instead only substituting foreign suppliers with domestic suppliers, it would be harder
to account for the rise in value added, fixed costs and variable costs within firms. Indeed, in the early years of China's trade lib-
eralization, firms in industries that were particularly reliant on imported inputs arguably had few available substitutes among do-
mestic suppliers to facilitate their manufacturing processes.
We return to an earlier finding from Section 4.3, where in conjunction with Firm Fact 2, we reported that firms that sport a
wider span of stages in their global positioning also appear to import a smaller share of their inputs, while exporting a greater
share of their output. The conceptual framework above does not speak directly to these patterns, as the model has been agnostic
about the locations from which inputs are purchased and to which output is sold. It should be noted though that these last em-
pirical patterns are not inherently at odds with the underlying structure of the model. For example, if part of the fixed costs that
are incurred are related to identifying reliable domestic sources of customized inputs, this could explain why more productive
firms that undertake more stages within China are also seeing a decrease in the share of inputs they import.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined how Chinese firms position themselves in global production lines, and documented how this
position evolves over the firm lifecycle. First, for the country as a whole, there has been a sharp rise in the upstreamness of im-
ports, a stable pattern in the upstreamness of exports, and a rapid expansion in production stages conducted in China over the
1992–2014 period. Second, using detailed firm-level data, we have found that firms span more stages as they grow more produc-
tive, bigger and more experienced. This expansion is accompanied by a rise in value added, input use, fixed assets and profits,
even though profit margins are relatively unaffected. These patterns speak to how China's participation in GVCs has been shaping
structural transformation at the level of its manufacturing firms. Finally, we have illustrated with a stylized model how these pat-
terns can be explained in a production chain setting that features complementarities between the scope of stages a firm under-
takes and the scale of its production.
Much scope remains for future work on this broad topic. With the rise in trade tensions between China and the US, as well as
the global slowdown from the COVID-19 pandemic, it will be interesting to track how such developments that could uncouple
cross-border supply chains might affect the GVC positioning of Chinese firms. Separately, it would be useful to pursue empirical
studies beyond China, to document if similar trends are present for other fast-growing developing countries that have sought to
engage in GVCs. Firm-level datasets that contain more detailed information on the product mix of domestic input purchases or on
the identity of domestic suppliers would be particularly welcome, in order to shed light on the role that vertical integration might
play in influencing a firm's span of stages. Such empirical findings would in turn inform the development of richer models of the
interplay between firms' participation in GVCs and firm-level outcomes. Of particular interest in this regard are implications for
the distribution of the gains from trade across firms and countries.
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Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2021.103445.49 Though we have also explored several measures of profitability such as the profit-to-sales ratio in the empirics, how this measure would shift with an increase in
firm productivity is theoretically ambiguous since both profits and sales would rise. One would need additional assumptions in order to pin down the direction of
change.
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